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SRI LANKA: TAMIL POLITICS AND THE QUEST 
FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Sri Lankan government’s refusal to negotiate seri-
ously with Tamil leaders or otherwise address legitimate 
Tamil and Muslim grievances is increasing ethnic tensions 
and damaging prospects for lasting peace. The admini-
stration, led by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party of Mahinda 
Rajapaksa, has refused to honour agreements with the Tamil 
National Alliance (TNA), broken promises to world lead-
ers and not implemented constitutional provisions for 
minimal devolution of power to Tamil-speaking areas of 
the north and east. Militarisation and discriminatory eco-
nomic development in Tamil and Muslim areas are breed-
ing anger and increasing pressure on moderate Tamil 
leaders. Tamil political parties need to remain patient and 
keep to their moderate course, while reaching out more 
directly to Muslims, Upcountry Tamils and Sinhalese. In-
ternational actors should press the government more ef-
fectively for speedy establishment of an elected provin-
cial council and full restoration of civilian government in 
the north, while insisting that it commence serious negotia-
tions with elected Tamil representatives from the north 
and east. 
Many believed that the end of the war and elimination of 
the separatist Tamil Tigers (LTTE) would open space for 
greater political debate and moderation among Tamils, 
while encouraging the government to abandon the hard-
line Sinhalese nationalism it had cultivated to support its 
war efforts and agree to devolve meaningful power to the 
majority Tamil-speaking northern and eastern provinces. 
While there has been an increase in democratic and mod-
erate voices among Tamils, the government has failed to 
respond in kind. 
Instead, it has adopted a policy of promising negotiations 
and expanded devolution in discussions with India, the 
U.S., and the UN Secretary-General, while denying these 
same things when addressing its Sinhala voting base. It has 
refused to negotiate seriously with TNA representatives, 
repeatedly failing to honour promises and ultimately break-
ing off talks in January 2012. Since then it has demanded 
that the TNA join the government’s preferred vehicle, a 
parliamentary select committee (PSC), a process clearly 
designed to dilute responsibility and buy time. Three-and-
a-half years after the end of the war, President Rajapaksa 
continues to delay the long-promised election to the north-
ern provincial council – elections the TNA would be nearly 
certain to win. Despite repeated public promises, the 
president has refused to grant even the limited powers os-
tensibly given to provincial councils under the constitu-
tion’s thirteenth amendment. Instead, he and other senior 
officials have begun to discuss the amendment’s possible 
repeal or replacement by even weaker forms of devolu-
tion. 
Even as the government refuses to respond to longstand-
ing demands for power sharing, Tamil political power and 
identity are under sustained assault in the north and east. 
While Tamil leaders and nationalist intellectuals base their 
demands for political autonomy on the idea that these re-
gions are the traditional areas of Tamil habitation, govern-
ment figures, including the president’s powerful brother 
and defence secretary, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, follow a long 
line of Sinhala nationalist thinking and explicitly reject 
that the north has any privileged Tamil character. Military 
and economic policies have been institutionalising this 
ideological position with vigour. 
The de facto military occupation of the northern province 
and biased economic development policies appear designed 
to undermine Tamils’ ability to claim the north and east as 
their homeland. For many Tamils, this confirms their long-
held belief that it was only the LTTE’s guns that placed 
their concerns and need for power sharing on the political 
agenda. In the face of the government’s resistance to a fair 
and negotiated settlement, TNA leaders have come under 
increasing pressure from their constituencies to adopt more 
confrontational language and tactics. Growing demands 
for the right to self-determination for the Tamil nation and 
hints that separatist goals have not been permanently aban-
doned have, in turn, provoked harsh reactions and expres-
sions of distrust from Sinhala leaders. 
The situation is likely to remain difficult, with major ne-
gotiating breakthroughs unlikely in the near term. None-
theless, the international community – especially India and 
the U.S. – should increase pressure on President Raja-
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paksa to significantly reduce the numbers and influence 
of the military in the north and hold credible northern pro-
vincial council elections in advance of the March 2013 
meeting of the UN Human Rights Council. The president 
should also be pressed to agree to the TNA’s reasonable 
terms for joining the PSC and begin implementing the thir-
teenth amendment meaningfully. Effective and lasting pow-
er sharing will almost certainly require forms of devolu-
tion that go beyond the current unitary definition of the 
state. Yet if skilfully handled, the current political conjunc-
ture, both domestic and international, holds out possibili-
ties to convince the government to concede greater space 
and ratchet back some of the worst abuses.  
For the TNA to improve Tamils’ chances of receiving a 
fair deal from the state and, ultimately, some significant 
degree of power sharing, it will need to articulate griev-
ances and the value of devolved powers more clearly and 
in ways that larger numbers of the other main communi-
ties – in particular Sinhalese and Muslims – can understand 
and accept as reasonable. In particular, the demand for 
autonomy needs to be framed in ways that can reassure at 
least some large minority of Sinhalese that the threat of 
secession is no longer there. It is also important for Tamil 
political leaders of all parties to begin mending relations 
with Muslims, so badly damaged by LTTE killings and the 
expulsion of all Muslims from the northern province in 
1990. The TNA should insist that Muslim representatives 
be given a central role in negotiations on expanded devo-
lution of power. 
Finally, the Tamil leadership needs to find both practical 
and rhetorical ways of building links between its struggle 
for rights and power sharing and the growing unease 
among Sinhalese at the corruption and abuse of power 
characteristic of the Rajapaksa government. The Tamil 
struggle for rights and freedom is likely to succeed only 
when the broader national struggle for the restoration of 
democracy and the rule of law, including the depoliticisa-
tion of the judiciary and the police, has made substantial 
progress. Joining together efforts to solve the two differ-
ent forms of the “national question” should become an 
imperative part of the struggle for Tamil rights. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
To the Tamil National Alliance (TNA): 
1. Maintain commitment to bilateral negotiations with 
the government to achieve substantial autonomy for 
the north and east within a united Sri Lanka; work to 
strengthen ties with other communities and broaden 
its reform agenda, by: 
a) acknowledging LTTE crimes, particularly the ex-
pulsion of northern Muslims, apologising for not 
speaking out then, and setting up truth and recon-
ciliation committees with Muslim and Sinhalese 
representatives; 
b) speaking clearly to Sinhalese about the nature of 
Tamil grievances, why these require devolution – 
but not independence – and how the TNA would 
use devolved powers; 
c) cooperating with the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress 
and other Muslim organisations to resolve land and 
resource conflicts in the north and east and on con-
stitutional negotiations and devolution; 
d) reaching out to Upcountry Tamil organisations to 
work jointly on shared concerns, particularly with 
regard to language discrimination and other prob-
lems facing Tamils outside the north and east; and 
e) building alliances with non-Tamil parties and or-
ganisations, including those in the Sinhala com-
munity that share concerns about corruption and 
abuse of power, for governance reforms outside the 
north and east, including implementation of core 
Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission 
recommendations. 
2. Prioritise developing the capacity of local TNA poli-
ticians and building a stronger community-level par-
ty organisation, better able to address local needs in 
the north and east, particularly on land and livelihood 
issues. 
To Tamil Civil Society Organisations  
and Leaders: 
3. Acknowledge Muslim and Sinhalese suffering from 
the war and LTTE actions; welcome and facilitate 
Muslim returns to the north by cooperating to resolve 
land and resource disputes; and establish or revive 
inter-ethnic peace committees able to counter politi-
cians and vested interests who seek to divide and con-
trol communities. 
To Organisations in the Tamil Diaspora  
and in Tamil Nadu: 
4. Support the TNA strategy for a negotiated power-
sharing agreement within a united Sri Lanka, including 
by sharing professional skills needed to strengthen 
the TNA’s organisational capacity. 
5. Acknowledge the LTTE’s role in deepening ethnic 
tensions and its shared responsibility for the suffer-
ing and massive loss of Tamil life in the final stages 
of the conflict and support inclusion of the LTTE’s 
actions in any independent international investigation 
into possible war crimes or crimes against humanity.  
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To the Government of Sri Lanka: 
6. Recommit publicly, before domestic and international 
audiences, to a political solution based on maximum 
devolution within a united Sri Lanka with significant 
autonomy for the north and east, including by: 
a) restarting bilateral negotiations with the Tamil Na-
tional Alliance (TNA) immediately, with the aim of 
reaching a basic consensus to take to the Parliamen-
tary Select Committee (PSC) for consideration; 
b) agreeing that the PSC will be a time-bound proc-
ess, with a formal agenda building upon discus-
sions with the TNA; PSC deliberations will not 
delay elections to the northern provincial council; 
and its outcomes are to pave the way for further 
devolution or other forms of power sharing;  
c) holding free and fair elections for the Northern 
Provincial Council by early 2013; 
d) implementing the thirteenth amendment so as to 
maximise powers granted to all provinces, begin-
ning by appointing civilian governors in the north 
and east with the confidence of their councils; in-
troducing legislation to reduce governors’ powers; 
giving the northern and eastern councils adequate 
financial resources and new powers to raise reve-
nue; and consulting meaningfully with them on 
development projects; and 
e) withdrawing the Divineguma bill and instead de-
centralising decision-making on economic devel-
opment to give local government significant input 
into and control over resources and projects. 
7. Begin rapid demilitarisation and return to civilian 
administration in the north and east by reducing sig-
nificantly the numbers and public presence of troops, 
removing troops from all influence over develop-
ment and humanitarian work and other civilian ac-
tivities, and placing the police fully in charge of law 
enforcement. 
8. Acknowledge and take concrete steps to respect the 
traditionally Tamil and Tamil-speaking character of 
the northern province and much of the eastern prov-
ince, including by: 
a) promising publicly that there will be no state-spon-
sored demographic change leading to the Sinhali-
sation of traditionally Tamil and Muslim areas in 
the north and east; 
b) protecting land rights, ensuring transparent proc-
esses for land policies and transactions, returning 
real property seized by the military and offering 
compensation when private land is used or taken; 
and 
c) protecting the cultural and religious rights of 
Tamils, both Hindu and Christian, as well as 
Muslims, including by ending the military-
supported construction of Buddhist statues and 
temples in the north and preventing and punish-
ing damage to or destruction of holy sites. 
9. Revise immediately policies that are exacerbating griev-
ances of Tamils in the north and east, including by: 
a) giving family members the names and locations 
of all individuals detained by any government 
agency for suspected LTTE involvement; allowing 
open mourning of the dead; and assisting recov-
ery of remains; 
b) acknowledging credible evidence of extensive 
enforced disappearances of Tamils in the final 
stages of the war and initiating an independent 
investigation;  
c) allow the Sri Lankan national anthem to be sung in 
Tamil at public events in Tamil-speaking areas and 
in both Sinhala and Tamil at national events; 
d) ending harassment of Tamil political activists and 
allowing all citizens in the north and east to freely 
protest and criticise the government and military 
without risk of violence or disappearance; and 
e) reducing restrictions on and harassment of hu-
manitarian workers and community groups, al-
lowing them to determine priorities, with input 
from local communities, and increase assistance, 
including in housing, livelihoods, and gender-
based violence and psycho-social programming. 
10. Act immediately on other longstanding and legiti-
mate grievances of Tamils throughout the island by: 
a) guaranteeing their physical security and respecting 
their basic human rights; disarming illegal armed 
groups; ending abduction, disappearance and ar-
bitrary detention as means of political control and 
ceasing harassment of Tamil women by military 
personnel; ensuring credible, independent inves-
tigations of past abuses; and establishing local and 
regional control and accountability mechanisms for 
all security forces; 
b) guaranteeing the right to use their language, espe-
cially when doing business with state officials; and 
c) ending all forms of discrimination, including with 
regard to government assistance, state jobs, courts 
and the police, and by increasing the percentage of 
Tamil-speakers in the security and public services. 
11. Expedite implementation of the core recommenda-
tions of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Com-
mission, in particular reversing consolidation of power 
in the presidency and military by repealing the eight-
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eenth amendment to the constitution and restoring 
constitutional limits on presidential power over the 
attorney general and judiciary; reestablishing inde-
pendent commissions on human rights, police, elec-
tions, bribery, finance and public service; removing the 
police from the defence ministry; and ceasing intimi-
dation of the judiciary, beginning with the withdraw-
al of impeachment proceedings against the Supreme 
Court chief justice. 
12. Cooperate fully with UN and other international 
agencies, including in implementing the March 2012 
Human Rights Council resolution; invite all relevant 
special procedure mandate holders to visit before the 
March 2013 session. 
To the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress, other 
Muslim Parties and the United National Party: 
13. Reaffirm support for devolution of power, beginning 
with rapid, expansive implementation of the thir-
teenth amendment, followed by reforms designed to 
increase, not reduce, effective devolution of power. 
To Sri Lanka’s International Partners,  
including China, India, Japan, the U.S., UK,  
EU, UN, Australia, and the International 
Financial Institutions: 
14. Press the government for quick, irreversible, and gen-
uine action to address Tamil grievances and pave the 
way for a lasting political solution, including most 
urgently: 
a) public recommitment by the president to implement 
the thirteenth amendment fully, followed by im-
mediate return to bilateral talks with the TNA, 
prior to activation of the PSC; 
b) elections to the northern provincial council by early 
2013, accompanied by demilitarisation of the north, 
its full return to civilian administration and a range 
of other policy changes to foster reconciliation;  
c) allowing all UN special procedure mandate hold-
ers who desire to visit Sri Lanka to do so in time to 
report to the March 2013 Human Rights Council 
session; and 
d) fulfilment of the March 2012 Human Rights Coun-
cil resolution, including rapid implementation of 
the core Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Com-
mission recommendations to establish independent 
bodies to hold presidential and military power to 
account and credible, independent investigations 
of alleged war crimes. 
15. Ensure that development aid does not further consol-
idate an undemocratic, ultimately volatile political re-
gime in the north and east; insist on transparency, ex-
ternal monitoring and non-discriminatory community 
participation in setting its priorities; and condition all 
loans and development aid, including from the World 
Bank, Asian Development Bank and International 
Monetary Fund, on demilitarisation and democratisa-
tion of the north and east. 
To the Secretariat and Member States of  
the Commonwealth: 
16. Insist that the Sri Lankan government take the actions 
listed in recommendation 14 above, and agree that in 
the event it fails to do so, the October 2013 Common-
wealth heads of government meeting will be moved 
from Colombo to an alternative location. 
Brussels/Colombo, 20 November 2012
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SRI LANKA: TAMIL POLITICS AND THE QUEST  
FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war three-and-a-half 
years ago, one of the fundamental problems that led to the 
violence – the state’s failure to protect the rights and 
guarantee the equal status of Tamils – remains.1 The gov-
ernment has done nothing to address the denial of rights 
and political marginalisation that gave rise to demands for 
political autonomy and ultimately for a separate state of 
Tamil Eelam. Instead, government policies, particularly in 
the Tamil-majority northern province and Tamil-speaking-
majority east, are generating new grievances and new anger.  
This report examines developments and debates in Tamil 
politics in post-war Sri Lanka. It analyses the challenges 
faced by Tamil political parties – both moderate and more 
strongly Tamil nationalist – searching for a lasting political 
solution and a new, more equitable constitutional frame-
work. It looks in particular at the constraints imposed by 
the strongly Sinhala nationalist government of President 
Mahinda Rajapaksa and its resistance to negotiating seri-
ously with Tamil parties and to presenting its own pro-
posals for constitutional changes. 
The paper analyses debates over the future of the thirteenth 
amendment to the constitution that remains the only suc-
cessful attempt to reform the constitution and reshape the 
state to address Tamil grievances. Established through 
Indian pressure and resisted violently by both Sinhalese 
and Tamil nationalists, the amendment has never been fully 
 
1 Previous Crisis Group reporting addresses many issues central 
to Sri Lankan Tamil politics, in particular Asia Reports N°219, 
Sri Lanka’s North I: The Denial of Minority Rights, 16 March 
2012; N°220, Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Mili-
tary, 16 March 2012; N°217, Sri Lanka: Women’s Insecurity in 
the North and East, 20 December 2011; N°209, Reconciliation 
in Sri Lanka: Harder than Ever, 21 July 2011; N°206, India 
and Sri Lanka after the LTTE, 23 June 2011; N°191, War 
Crimes in Sri Lanka, 17 May 2010; N°159, Sri Lanka’s Eastern 
Province: Land, Development, Conflict, 15 October 2008; 
N°141, Sri Lanka: Sinhala Nationalism and the Elusive South-
ern Consensus, 7 November 2007; N°134, Sri Lanka’s Mus-
lims: Caught in the Crossfire, 29 May 2007; and N°124, Sri 
Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process, 28 November 2006. 
implemented by any government, especially in the north 
and east. The question of whether and how to implement 
it, go beyond it or do away with it, is at the centre of po-
litical debate over what is often referred to as Sri Lanka’s 
“national question”. 
Based on interviews with politicians, lawyers, legal schol-
ars, and rights activists, the report is not a detailed argument 
on the merits of devolution or an analysis of particular 
power-sharing proposals. It focuses instead on the politi-
cal context in which debates over devolution and consti-
tutional negotiations play out and the positions of the key 
political actors. It looks closely at the approach of the 
largest Tamil political group, the Tamil National Alliance 
(TNA), and its fraught engagement with the government; 
examines the positions of the TNA’s Tamil critics and the 
challenges in formulating a principled, yet realistic strategy 
for the community when faced with a government opposed 
to any power sharing; and analyses the role of the Sin-
halese and Muslim communities and the need for the 
TNA and other Tamil actors to engage in creative and prin-
cipled ways with both groups, as well as with Sri Lanka’s 
other Tamil-speaking community, Upcountry Tamils. Fi-
nally, it considers what can be done by various parties, 
including those in the international community, to reverse 
the negative trends and begin progress toward a lasting 
settlement. 
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II. TAMIL GRIEVANCES AND THE 
FAILURE OF POLITICAL RESPONSES 
Tamil politics in post-independence Sri Lanka have de-
veloped in response to – and largely been defined by – a 
sense of individual and collective vulnerability to a state 
that has, over the course of many governments, aggres-
sively asserted the rights of the Sinhala majority.2 The re-
peated failure of Tamil political parties to win positive 
changes in state practices weakened their legitimacy and 
paved the way to separatism and militancy, culminating 
in nearly three decades of civil war between the govern-
ment and LTTE. With the end of the war and the LTTE in 
2009, Tamil nationalism is battered, but the ideas under-
pinning the initial calls for separatism still resonate with 
many and shape the political response to grievances.  
A. CONTINUING GRIEVANCES 
The following grievances have been at the heart of Tamil 
politics and the Tamil struggle for rights since the mid-
1950s.3 While the particular forms they take have changed 
over time, they remain at the centre of Sri Lanka’s unre-
solved “national question”. 
Language: The “Sinhala Only” act of 1956, which made 
Sinhala the sole official language for state business, had a 
devastating effect on the many Tamil civil servants who 
did not speak it and closed down opportunities for state 
employment for many others. It also sent a strong message 
to Tamils that they were less than equal citizens. Since 
1987, Tamil has been an official language, and there are 
legal guarantees that Tamil-speakers can access state ser-
vices and conduct government business in that tongue. In 
practice, however, Tamil-speakers often suffer language 
discrimination throughout the country.  
Land: Government irrigation and development projects 
in the eastern province from the late 1940s onwards saw 
 
2 The main Tamil-speaking community, Sri Lankan Tamils, are 
11.2 per cent of the population; 70 per cent of them live in the 
northern and eastern provinces. Upcountry Tamils, also known 
as Indian Origin Tamils, live mostly in the central hills and are 
4.2 per cent of the population. Of the combined Sri Lankan 
Tamil and Upcountry Tamil populations, just under 50 per cent 
live outside the north and east. Most Sri Lankan Muslims (9.2 
percent of the population) speak Tamil; those in the north and 
east have long, if fraught, connections with Tamils. Almost 22 
per cent of Colombo district is Tamil-speaking. “Population by 
ethnic group according to districts, 2012”, Sri Lanka Department 
of Census and Statistics, at www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/ 
CPH2011/index.php?fileName=pop42&gp=Activities&tpl=3. 
3 Tamil-speaking Muslims and Upcountry Tamils suffer from 
many of these problems, as well as distinct grievances of their 
own. 
the arrival of tens of thousands of Sinhala peasants. Despite 
objections from Tamil politicians, state-sponsored coloni-
sation projects continued into the 1980s and ultimately 
contributed to a major shift in the population of the east: 
Sinhalese grew from being 5 per cent of the province in 
1921 to 25 per cent in 1981.4 There is evidence that a simi-
lar strategy may be underway in the north.5 
Identity and culture: Buddhism, the religion of most Sin-
halese and almost no Tamils, was given special status in 
the 1972 and 1978 constitutions, despite objections from 
Tamil parties.6 State history textbooks, archaeological pro-
jects and public imagery define and celebrate Sri Lanka as 
an essentially Sinhala and Buddhist country. While scores 
of Buddha statues have been built with military assistance 
in the post-war north, numerous Tamil Hindu religious 
sites have been destroyed or effectively closed.7  
Centralisation of power: A strongly centralised state has 
made it virtually impossible for Tamils to have meaning-
ful control over land or economic policies in the areas 
where they are traditionally the majority – the north and 
east. Agreements in 1957 and 1965 with Tamil leaders to 
grant limited autonomy to the Tamil-speaking north and 
east were abrogated after opposition from nationalist Sin-
halese.8 The centralisation of power grew even greater un-
der the 1972 and 1978 constitutions, both of which de-
fined Sri Lanka as a unitary state. Neither constitution 
was developed with any meaningful involvement of 
Tamil parties. 
Physical insecurity: Beginning with the 1956 mob attack 
on their leaders conducting a peaceful protest outside par-
liament, Tamils suffered increasingly violent attacks that 
had varying degrees of government support. Serious anti-
Tamil mob violence later that year and again in 1958, 1977, 
1979 and 1981 culminated in the state-sanctioned pogrom 
 
4 For an analysis of colonisation and the political debates it 
produced, see Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s Eastern Prov-
ince, op. cit., pp. 4-6. In 1982, Trincomalee district was 40 per 
cent Sinhalese and Ampara 38 per cent. For full provincial and 
district ethnic ratios in the east, see ibid. 
5 See Crisis Group Asia Report, Sri Lanka’s North I, op. cit., 
pp. 20-27. 
6 Chapter two of the constitution states that “the Republic of Sri 
Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accord-
ingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster the 
Buddha Sasana”. 
7 See Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s North I, op. cit., p. 18.  
8 For more on the1957 Bandaranaiake-Chelvanayakam pact and 
the 1965 Dudley Senanayake-Chelvanayakam pact, see Appen-
dix B. The failure of both SLFP- and UNP-led governments, 
under pressure from Sinhala nationalist groups, to honour even 
modest compromise deals made with the Tamil Federal Party 
(FP), was a major factor behind increased Tamil support for a 
separate state. 
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of July 1983, when as many as 2,000 Tamils were killed 
and tens of thousands were displaced – some fleeing to the 
northern province, others overseas. State counter-insur-
gency policies and anti-terrorism laws directed at Tamil 
militant groups that emerged in the late 1970s and early 
1980s produced ever greater suffering for Tamil civilians, 
culminating in the tens of thousands killed in the final 
months of war.9  
Economic discrimination: Tamils’ chances at education 
and state employment were badly affected from the 1950s 
into the 1970s by state policies, including for university 
admissions (later rescinded) that harmed many young 
Tamils in Jaffna.10 The chronic economic under-
development of Tamil-majority areas has also been a ma-
jor source of discontent.  
Lack of redress: Thanks to the majoritarian nature of Sri 
Lanka’s democracy,11 through which Tamil concerns have 
been consistently marginalised, ethnically biased state in-
stitutions and an increasingly politicised court system, 
there has been little or no redress for or legal protection 
against the range of injustices faced by Tamils.12  
Tamil militancy, starting in the 1970s with Indian govern-
ment training,13 brought with it new problems for Tamils 
in the form of the government’s brutal counter-insurgency 
tactics, as well as intra-community violence, including the 
LTTE’s murder of many moderate Tamil politicians.14 
Militancy also deepened the already growing split with 
the smaller number of Tamil-speaking Muslims, who in-
creasingly saw themselves as a separate community. 
B. NATION, HOMELAND, SEPARATISM 
The Tamil nationalist position became more extreme in 
line with the rise in militancy. While federalism, with 
 
9 See Crisis Group Report, War Crimes in Sri Lanka, op. cit. 
10 K.M. de Silva, Reaping the Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic 
Politics in Sri Lanka (New Delhi, 1998), pp. 131-135, 166-173. 
11 Sri Lanka has since independence been less a democracy than 
an “ethnocracy”, where the state is used systematically to ensure 
the dominance of one community. Oren Yiftachel, Ethnocracy: 
Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine (Philadelphia, 
2006).  
12 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°172, Sri Lanka’s Judiciary: 
Politicised Courts, Compromised Rights, 30 June 2009. 
13 For more on India’s role in the growth of Tamil militancy, 
see Crisis Group Report, India and Sri Lanka, op. cit. 
14 Militancy made some problems harder to blame just on Sin-
hala-dominated governments: economic and infrastructural un-
derdevelopment of north and east, detentions and round-ups of 
Tamils and other human rights abuses, the decreasing percent-
age of Tamil civil servants and police; all were in part an effect 
of the war and a response, often misguided, to LTTE terrorist 
tactics. 
autonomy for the north and east, had long been the cen-
tral political aim of its politics,15 the 1976 Vaddukoddai 
resolution, passed by the Tamil United Liberation Front 
(TULF), which was overwhelming endorsed by Tamil vot-
ers in 1977, confirmed mainstream support for an inde-
pendent state of Tamil Eelam.16 Many of TULF politi-
cians considered the pro-independence stance an opening 
gambit for negotiations, but younger, increasingly mili-
tant Tamils were true believers and rejected any attempts 
to backtrack.17  
The essence of the nationalist position was rearticulated 
in the 1985 “Thimpu principles”.18 These demanded that 
the state recognise four claims: that the Tamils are a dis-
tinct nationality; that they have an identifiable homeland 
whose territorial integrity must be guaranteed; that the 
Tamil nation has the inalienable right of self-determina-
tion; and that all Tamils throughout the island have the 
right to full citizenship and other fundamental democratic 
rights.19 
 
15 Devanesan Nesiah, “Tamil Nationalism”, Marga Institute, Co-
lombo, 2001, pp. 13, 16. According to Nesiah and other schol-
ars, support for federalism grew after the Sinhala Only act of 
1956, and the few Tamil politicians who supported separatism 
before 1976 were routinely defeated in elections. 
16 The TULF was composed of the then dominant Federal Party, 
the smaller All-Ceylon Tamil Congress and the Ceylon Workers 
Congress, representing Tamils in the central plantation areas. It 
was first formed as the Tamil United Front (TUF) in 1972, but 
changed its name in 1977 to reflect its new, separatist platform. 
The Vaddukoddai resolution concluded with a call for “the Tamil 
Nation in general and the Tamil youth in particular to come 
forward to throw themselves fully into the sacred fight for free-
dom and to flinch not till the goal of a sovereign state of Tamil 
Eelam is reached”. For the text, see Edrisinha, et al., Power-
Sharing in Sri Lanka: Constitutional and Political Documents 
1926-2008 (Colombo, 2008).  
17 Nesiah, “Tamil Nationalism”, op. cit., p. 17. Many scholars 
see the Vadukkodai resolution as forced on mainstream parties 
by young militants over whom the older politicians lost control, 
and by whom some were ultimately killed. The separatist claim 
provoked fury among many Sinhalese; anti-Tamil violence grew 
more regular and vicious, with riots in 1977, 1979, 1981 and 1983. 
18 They were formulated jointly by the TULF and the five main 
Tamil militant groups of the time, including the LTTE, at Indian-
sponsored peace talks with the government in Bhutan. While 
the Thimpu principles have generally been seen as supporting a 
separate state, there have been various attempts to rework them 
to make them consistent with devolution in a united Sri Lanka. 
See, for instance, Rohan Edrisinha, “Meeting Tamil Aspirations 
within a United Sri Lanka: Constitutional Options”, in Rohan 
Edrisinha and Asanga Welikala, Essays on Federalism in Sri 
Lanka (Colombo, 2008). 
19 A.J. Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism (Vancouver, 2000), 
pp. 144-145. 
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The claim of a Tamil homeland is rooted in the existence 
of the medieval Tamil-speaking Jaffna kingdom.20 While 
such a kingdom did exist for hundreds of years, there is 
no evidence that it controlled much territory in the east, 
as nationalists claim.21 The ambitious version of a “Tamil 
homeland” that covers the entire northern and eastern prov-
inces in fact includes many areas with a long and com-
plex history of shifting and ethnically mixed settlement 
and political control.22 It includes territory inhabited for 
centuries by Tamil-speaking Muslims, who constitute half 
the Tamil-speaking people in the east and roughly ten per 
cent in the north. Most Muslims would reject inclusion in 
such a homeland. The usefulness of the homeland idea to 
ground a meaningful claim to self-determination is further 
weakened by the fact that as many as half of Sri Lanka’s 
Tamils live outside the territory claimed in their name.23 
None of this challenges the incontestable fact that Tamils 
form one of the constituent peoples of Sri Lanka, nor that 
Tamil-speaking communities have lived in the north, and 
much of the east, for at least two millennia and been a clear 
majority there for centuries. Even without the classic ver-
sion of the homeland claim, there are still strong arguments 
for significant political autonomy for the north and east: as 
a safe refuge;24 a place where Tamils and Muslims can con-
trol lands their communities have lived on for centuries 
 
20 It continues to be invoked today, as in the speech by TNA 
leader Sampanthan to the Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) 
convention in May 2012 which argues that “up to 500 years ago 
… our people had their own sovereign Tamil governments”. 
21 For academic critiques of Tamil homeland claims, particular-
ly relating to the eastern province, see Reaping the Whirlwind, 
op. cit., pp. 207-213, and G.H. Peiris, “An Appraisal of the 
Concept of a Traditional Tamil Homeland in Sri Lanka”, Ethnic 
Studies Report, vol. IX, no. 1 (January 1991). 
22 Tamil Eelam, as defined by the LTTE, also included the 
Puttalam district, on the west coast, and covered some two 
thirds of the coastline, a source of outrage among many Sinha-
lese. The LTTE’s “ethnic cleansing” of Muslims and regular 
attacks on Sinhalese living in “border villages” in the east and 
north-central provinces show how they thought of pluralism in 
Tamil Eelam. 
23 According to government census figures released in 2012, 30 
per cent of Tamils live outside the north and east. If Upcountry 
Tamils are included, 49 per cent do so. “Population by ethnic 
group”, op. cit. For earlier analysis, see Crisis Group Report, 
Sri Lanka: Sinhala Nationalism, op. cit., p. 16. 
24 Tamil scholar A.J. Wilson argues that “the vision of a Tamil 
homeland dawned for the first time” in 1958, in reaction to the 
first major violence by Sinhalese against Tamils. Sri Lankan 
Tamil Nationalism, op. cit., p. 89. The idea of the Tamil home-
land as a refuge for a people vulnerable to violence was given 
unofficial state approval when the government chartered ships 
in 1983 to send Tamils from Colombo to areas in the north and 
east. Homeland as a practical refuge, however, is in principle 
distinct from a homeland defined as the area of historical habi-
tation of a distinct nationality deserving of collective self-rule. 
and where various forms of Tamil and Muslim identity and 
culture can flourish more easily; and where Tamils can be 
something other than a perpetually outvoted minority.  
C. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT  
AND AFTER 
Despite attempts and promises to address demands for ter-
ritorial autonomy in the historically Tamil-speaking north 
and east, the thirteenth amendment to the constitution, 
passed in 1987 under intense Indian pressure,25 is the first 
and only constitutional or administrative arrangement that 
attempts to devolve power. Adopted pursuant to the July 
1987 Indo-Lanka Accord, it established provincial councils 
through which Tamils were to be granted limited powers of 
self-rule in a merged north-eastern province.26 But there 
are major limitations to its approach, and it has had little 
effect. 
While the Indo-Lanka Accord gave ambiguous, watered-
down recognition to the idea that the north and east consti-
tuted the Tamil homeland,27 the provincial council system 
was made to fit within the strongly centralised unitary 
state. As a result, the system offers only the most fragile 
delegation of powers, with multiple avenues by which the 
president and parliament can take back these powers and 
obstruct the provincial councils.28 No councils – even in 
 
25 Pressure included food airdrops to Tamils in Jaffna, where 
the LTTE was under siege by the Sri Lankan military. For more 
on India’s involvement in Sri Lanka’s ethnic crisis in the mid- 
and late-1980s, see Crisis Group Report, India and Sri Lanka, 
op. cit. 
26 The Indo-Lanka Agreement to Establish Peace and Normalcy 
in Sri Lanka”, was signed by Sri Lankan President J.R. 
Jayawardene and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in Co-
lombo on 29 July 1987. The accord also made Tamil an official 
language. The decision to establish councils in all provinces, 
not just in the north and east from which the demand for devo-
lution had come, was designed to weaken Sinhalese resistance 
and dampen the sense that the amendment was granting territo-
rial and ethnically-based autonomy and was the first step to-
wards a separate Tamil state. Provincial councils have func-
tioned everywhere but the north and east since 1988, but with 
little power, few resources and no great effect. 
27 Clause 1.4 of the accord “recognis[ed] that the Northern and 
the Eastern Provinces have been areas of historical habitation 
of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all times 
hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic groups”.  
28 The amendment establishes three sets of powers – solely for 
provincial councils; reserved for the central government; and a 
“concurrent” list on which both parliament and councils can 
legislate. In practice, provincial councils have never been able 
to pass statutes on issues in the concurrent list and have lost 
control even over many of the powers formally on the provin-
cial list. For a more detailed analysis of the limited nature of 
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majority Sinhalese areas – have ever been allowed to exer-
cise the formally granted police and land authorities. With-
out effective taxation powers, councils have been made to 
rely on the limited and politically motivated generosity of 
the central government. 
The initial north-eastern provincial council was rejected 
outright by the LTTE and dissolved by parliament in 1990 
in response to attempts by LTTE rivals to convert it into a 
constitution-drafting assembly for the “Eelam Democratic 
Republic”.29 With no functioning council from 1990 to 
2008, the merged province was administered directly by 
the president through an appointed governor. A provincial 
council was established in the eastern province in 2008 
after the LTTE had been pushed out and the province had 
been “demerged” from the north via an October 2006 Su-
preme Court judgment.30  
While doing little to address Tamil demands, the thirteenth 
amendment nonetheless engendered violent opposition 
from many Sinhalese. It split the ruling United National 
Party (UNP) and bolstered the Sinhalese nationalist Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Opponents denounced the 
creation of the north-east provincial council as a stepping-
stone toward a separate Tamil state in the merged region. 
India’s role in imposing the change was particularly con-
troversial and a major factor that fuelled the second vio-
lent uprising of the Sinhala nationalist and leftist Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (People’s Liberation Front, JVP), 
which led to the deaths of tens of thousands of Sinhalese 
between 1988 and 1990.31 
Over the next two decades, there was a consensus among 
policymakers, including all but the most nationalist Sin-
halese, that more substantial power sharing would be 
needed to satisfy Tamil aspirations. Even if the LTTE was 
unlikely to agree to anything short of a separate state, the 
hope among many devolution-supporters was that a politi-
cal package granting adequate powers to the north and east 
and offering other protections for minority rights would 
 
devolution under the thirteenth amendment, see Section IV.A 
and Appendix C. 
29 Chief Minister and EPRLF leader A. Varatharajaperamul fled 
Sri Lanka and has been living in exile in India ever since.  
30 For details on the Supreme Court’s controversial judgment 
demerging the north and east, see Asanga Welikala, “Devolu-
tion within the Unitary State: A Constitutional Assessment of 
the Thirteenth Amendment with reference to the experience in 
the Eastern Province”, in “Devolution in the Eastern Province: 
Implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment and Public Per-
ceptions, 2008-2010”, Centre for Policy Alternatives, August 
2010, pp. 20-22. The two provinces were formally separated in 
January 2007. The north remains without a functioning council 
and is ruled by a governor appointed by the president. 
31 For details on the JVP’s two insurrections, see Crisis Group 
Report, Sri Lanka: Sinhala Nationalism, op. cit., pp. 10-11. 
help win enough Tamil support to weaken the LTTE or con-
vince it to accept a solution within a reformed Sri Lanka. 
Several attempts were made between 1991 and 2006, but 
all faltered.32  
The political context, and with it the chances for mean-
ingful devolution, changed substantially with Mahinda 
Rajapaksa’s election as president in November 2005.33 He 
came to power on an anti-LTTE platform extremely criti-
cal of the UNP-sponsored peace process and promising to 
defend what he saw as Sri Lanka’s threatened sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. Even as the government was on 
the brink of returning to war in July 2006, he initiated the 
All-Party Representative Committee (APRC), for “formu-
lating a political and constitutional framework for the reso-
lution of the national question” through “maximum devo-
lution” within a united Sri Lanka. It produced far-reaching, 
imaginative proposals over the next three years, but the 
president provided no process for acting on them.34 
D. LOWERING THE BAR 
The decades of devolution and power-sharing initiatives, 
including the APRC, can only be understood in the con-
text of, and to a significant degree as a response to, the 
LTTE’s military pressure.35 Now that this is gone, it appears 
that the Rajapaksas, and much of the Sinhalese political 
class, see no real need for a political solution.36 After 
 
32 See Appendix B. 
33 Rajapaksa defeated UNP candidate, Ranil Wickremasinghe, 
by just 180,000 votes and would have lost had the LTTE not 
enforced a boycott on Tamil voters in areas it controlled in the 
north and east. Allegations, never proved, emerged after the 
election that the boycott was in part the result of a deal with 
Rajapaksa including a large monetary payment to the LTTE. 
See “Opposition leader calls for arrest of president’s brother, 
chief of staff, and treasury secretary”, U.S. embassy Colombo 
cable, 14 June 2007, as made public by WikiLeaks. President Ra-
japaksa has long denied those allegations. “President outlines 
peace strategy”, interview with Inderjit Badwar, priu.gov.lk, 20 
September 2007.  
34 “Sri Lanka President stresses peace through talks and a 
‘home grown’ solution for the ethnic crisis”, ColomboPage, 11 
July 2006. For an analysis of the difficulties facing the APRC 
process during its first year, see Crisis Group Report, Sri 
Lanka: Sinhala Nationalism, op. cit., pp. 23-27. For further de-
tails on the APRC process, see Appendix B. 
35 The current predicament is in part an effect of India and the 
U.S. helping the defeat of the LTTE without demanding guar-
antees or tangible movement toward a political solution and in-
stead accepting the president’s promises that he would offer 
Tamils something once the LTTE was gone. 
36 In the words of Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, “the 
existing constitution is more than enough for us to live togeth-
er. I don’t think there is any issue on this more than that …. I 
mean now the LTTE is gone, I don’t think there is any require-
ment .… Devolution wise, I think we have done enough, I don’t 
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seven years of Rajapaksa rule, the bar for an acceptable 
constitutional settlement has been lowered radically.37 
The debate is no longer focused on whether and how to 
go beyond the unitary state and assure that meaningful 
power is shared across regions and ethnic communities. 
Instead, 25 years after the Indo-Lanka accord, the struggle 
is to convince the government to implement even the 
minimalist and tenuous delegation of powers in the thir-
teenth amendment. 
With no powers over police or state land granted to prov-
inces, other authorities undermined more subtly, and the 
northern and eastern provinces “demerged” since early 
2007, the president’s repeated promises to fully imple-
ment the thirteenth amendment remain unfulfilled. Inter-
national pressure can produce occasional statements prom-
ising to “go beyond” or “build on” the amendment, but 
for now the constitutional regime is “thirteenth minus” 
rather than “thirteenth plus”. With the regime showing no 
interest in serious negotiations or any power sharing, the 
post-war challenge Tamil parties face is severe.  
 
think there is a necessity to go beyond that”. “Gotabaya hits 
out”, Daily Mirror, 8 August 2011. 
37 The lowering of the bar began most clearly with the Indian 
government’s January 2008 statement recognising the APRC’s 
“interim” proposal for implementing the thirteenth amendment 
as “a welcome first step”. “In response to a question on the rec-
ommendations of the All Party Representatives Committee in 
Sri Lanka”, external affairs ministry, 24 January 2008. The im-
plicit endorsement of the minimal plan helped undercut any 
chance that the APRC might produce something that went be-
yond existing minimalist devolution. See P. Saravanamuttu, 
“APRC: The Year of the Rat has begun”, Groundviews.org, 30 
January 2008. 
III. POST-WAR TAMIL POLITICS  
UNDER TNA LEADERSHIP 
With the military defeat of the LTTE, the widely accepted 
political representative of the Tamil people in the north 
and east is again a democratically elected coalition of 
parties, the TNA. Its daunting challenge is to pick up the 
shattered pieces of the liberation struggle and build an 
effective democratic political organisation in the face of a 
powerful and hostile government with a proven ability to 
destroy opposition parties.38 
A. RESURRECTING THE DEMOCRATIC 
TRADITION IN TAMIL POLITICS 
1. The TNA 
One of the most damaging aspects of the LTTE’s violent 
struggle was its sustained attack on democratic Tamil po-
litical parties. For the Tigers, the military struggle trumped 
politics, and politicians who did not unquestioningly accept 
their leadership and the goal of Eelam were denounced as 
traitors and often killed.39 This did major damage to the 
basic fabric of Tamil civil society and its traditions of po-
litical organisation.  
The TNA, founded in 2001 with the LTTE’s encouragement, 
was the ambiguous product of the Tigers’ anti-politics: a 
political formation with no real autonomy and no right to 
dissent, but used by the LTTE to claim popular support. It 
was built from parties with quite different histories and 
relationships to the LTTE and the armed struggle. Some 
member parties – Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation 
(TELO) and Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation 
Front (EPRLF) – were ex-militant groups, former LTTE 
rivals but not opposed to violence. The TULF and the All 
Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), on the other hand, were 
longstanding democratic parties; TULF members in par-
ticular were often uncomfortable with LTTE tactics and 
control. Some TNA politicians were genuinely supportive 
of the LTTE; others followed it under duress.40 
 
38 With the sole exception of the TNA, the Rajapaksa govern-
ment has encouraged and exploited damaging splits in the two 
major opposition parties – the UNP and JVP – and in two eth-
nic minority parties, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) 
and the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP). 
39 Among the scores of Tamil politicians killed by the LTTE 
were Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) leader A. Amir-
thalingam, in 1989, and TULF parliamentarian and constitu-
tional scholar Neelan Tiruchelvam, in 1999. 
40 TNA politicians during LTTE rule over the north and east 
faced a deadly dilemma: their lives at risk from the LTTE if 
they failed to follow its dictates and from the government if 
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Many have criticised the TNA for doing the LTTE’s bid-
ding and publicly recognising it as the Tamil people’s 
sole representative.41 In the 2005 presidential election, the 
LTTE enforced a Tamil boycott. Many Sinhalese remain 
deeply suspicious of the TNA; to ensure its democratic 
commitments, it will need to reject the Tigers’ legacy more 
clearly than it has, however hard this will be with many 
of its voters.42  
With the defeat of the LTTE, many, including some TNA 
leaders, had hope of new space for democratic political 
debate and organisation and greater openness to compro-
mise.43 To some extent this has come true. Despite im-
mense pressure from the government, including physical 
attacks on candidates and other obstruction, the TNA has 
won all three elections it has contested: the April 2010 
parliamentary elections, the local authorities elections held 
throughout 2011 and the September 2012 eastern provin-
cial elections.44 Led by R. Sampanthan, head of its largest 
 
they did. Three sitting TNA members of parliament were mur-
dered in the final years of the war: Joseph Pararajasingham, 
shot in Batticaloa, Christmas eve 2005; Nadarajah Raviraj, shot 
in Colombo, 10 November 2006; and K. Sivanesan, killed by a 
roadside bomb near LTTE-controlled Killinochchi. 6 March 
2008. While all three killings have yet to be adequately investi-
gated, human rights groups alleged that government forces or 
pro-government militias were responsible. The government has 
denied the allegations. Tamil politicians who resisted the LTTE, 
on the other hand, had to live under government protection and 
make other serious compromises. In March 2011, there was a 
reported attack on TNA legislator S. Sritharan. “TNA MP Sri-
tharan narrowly escapes assassination in Anuradhapura”, Tamil 
Net, 7 March 2011.  
41 In advance of the April 2004 general election, the TNA an-
nounced: “Accepting the LTTE’s leadership as the national 
leadership of ‘Tamil Eelam’ Tamils and the Liberation Tigers 
as the sole and authentic representative of the Tamil people, let 
us devote our full cooperation for the ideals of the Liberation 
Tigers’ struggle with honesty and steadfastness. Let us endeav-
our determinedly, collectively as one group, one nation, one 
country, transcending race and religious differences, under the 
leadership of the LTTE, for a life of liberty, honour and justice 
for the Tamil people”. Quoted in Shamindra Ferdinando, “LTTE/ 
TNA alliance and a damning EU statement”, Island, 27 July 
2012. The same election saw the LTTE accused of intimidating 
non-TNA candidates. “Sri Lanka Parliamentary Elections, Eu-
ropean Election Observation Mission, Final Report”, 2 April 
2004.  
42 See the important criticisms of the TNA by Dayapala Thira-
nagama, “Solitude in Jaffna and the silence of a city”, Island, 
21 September 2012. 
43 Crisis Group interview, senior TNA leader, Colombo, July 
2009. 
44 The TNA gained 14 seats in parliament in 2010 and won con-
trol of almost all local councils in the north and in Tamil major-
ity areas in the east in 2011 elections. For a detailed analysis of 
the 2012 eastern province elections, see Section V.B.2 below. 
party, the Illankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK),45 it also cur-
rently includes the EPRLF of Suresh Premachandran and 
TELO of Selvam Adaikalanathan, as well as more recent 
additions, People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam 
(PLOTE), headed by D. Siddharthan and the TULF of V. 
Anandasangarree. The ACTC left in the run-up to the April 
2010 parliamentary elections, after Sampanthan removed 
from the candidates list all legislators whom the LTTE 
had brought into the party.46 
For now, the 79-year-old Sampanthan firmly controls the 
alliance, respected as its elder statesman and valued for his 
international credibility.47 There are tensions, however, and 
in the absence of tangible improvements for Tamils, es-
pecially in the north and east, divisions could grow, with 
real risk of a split after his retirement or death.  
The most serious challenge to TNA unity is along party 
lines.48 Sampanthan has tried to institutionalise the domi-
nance of ITAK, to the dismay of other parties’ leaders. 
The EPRLF’s leader, Premachandran, in particular, has 
complained publicly about the refusal of Sampanthan and 
ITAK to register the TNA as a separate party, which 
would give the heads of the smaller members more 
power.49 The leaders of all four non-ITAK TNA parties 
have reportedly written to Sampanthan again demanding 
such registration and complaining about what they con-
 
45 At the TNA’s establishment in 2001, Sampanthan was part of 
the TULF. Unhappy with the TNA’s close ties to the LTTE, 
TULF’s V. Anandasangaree refused to allow it to contest the 
2004 parliamentary elections under the TULF banner, at which 
point Sampanthan and the other TULF members in the TNA 
resurrected ITAK. Literally translated from the Tamil as “Lan-
kan Tamil State Party”, it was known in English as the Federal 
Party and was the dominant Tamil party from the 1950s until 
the 1970s, when it became the main constituent of the TULF.  
46 The Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF) was launched on 
28 February 2010, with the ACTC as its main constituent party. 
Headed by ACTC leader Gajen Ponnambalam, it includes for-
mer TNA Jaffna district parliamentarians Selvarajah Kajendran 
and Pathmini Sithamparanathan, both of whom were brought 
into the TNA by the LTTE. 
47 Crisis Group interviews, political analysts, September, Octo-
ber 2012. 
48 Another potential fault line is ideological. Some TNA par-
liamentarians, eg, S. Sritharan from the Vanni, hold significant-
ly more nationalist, perhaps separatist, positions. For now these 
differences are submerged. The more nationalist TNPF/ACTC’s 
lack of success in the 2010 parliamentary elections persuaded 
most Tamil politicians their only chance at winning rights was 
via the TNA.  
49 Registering the TNA as a party “would give 
[Premachandran] a greater role, as he’d be an office-bearer in 
the party, rather than part of a loose alliance in which his party 
runs under the banner of ITAK, over which he has no power”. 
Crisis Group phone interview, Muslim activist close to SLMC, 
October 2012.  
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sider his autocratic style.50 “Post-Sampanthan, what’s in 
store for TNA? It doesn’t look good”, said a lawyer 
who works closely with the party.51 There is no one else 
with the stature or support to bring its constituent parties to-
gether, which may help explain the lack of urgency with 
which the government has approached negotiations with 
it.52  
2. Pro-government Tamil parties 
The government also hopes friendly Tamil parties will 
undercut TNA support by delivering patronage and other 
practical benefits. The Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal 
(TMVP) has proven a weak ally for Colombo in the east.53 
Neither its chief, former eastern province chief minister 
S. Chandrakanthan (aka Pillaiyan), nor its founder, now 
senior-SLFP leader V. Muralitheran, better known as Ka-
runa, has a wide following. Both are more likely to be 
denounced by Tamils for abandoning the national cause 
and for the many serious human rights violations of which 
their followers are accused.54 
The northern province, and in particular Jaffna district, may 
be more fertile ground for the government, given the long-
established presence of Douglas Devananda’s Eelam Peo-
ple’s Democratic Party (EPDP) and its ability to deliver 
significant benefits to supporters.55 While most Tamils are 
highly critical of Devananda and the EPDP, which is ac-
cused of numerous murders, disappearances and other 
crimes,56 they undeniably have some support in Jaffna. 
The party’s relative success in municipal elections on the 
Jaffna peninsula, particularly in Jaffna town, suggests it 
 
50 Chris Kamalendran, “TNA splits 4-1 on registration”, The 
Sunday Times, 28 October 2012; P.K. Balachandran, “TNA 
heading for split over registration as political party?”, New In-
dian Express, 1 October 2012.  
51 Crisis Group telephone interview, lawyer, September 2012. 
52 Crisis Group interviews, politicians and political analysts, 
August, September 2012. 
53 In the September provincial elections in the east, the TMVP 
won a single seat, the TNA eleven. See Section V.B.2 below. 
54 For information on alleged human rights violations by 
Karuna and the TMVP, see Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s 
Eastern Province, op. cit. Both Karuna and Pillaiyan have de-
nied involvement in any crimes. 
55 The EPDP, one of many Tamil militant groups from the 1980s, 
has been aligned with the government since 1990. It is strong-
est in Jaffna. Devananda is currently traditional industries and 
small enterprise development minister. 
56 For information on alleged EPDP human rights violations, 
see Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s North I, op. cit. 
Devananda has consistently denied all such allegations, includ-
ing those against the EPDP in the report of the government’s 
2011 “Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission” 
(LLRC). “Ahinsaka Kolla Douglas to take LLRC to court”, 
Lakbima News, 8 January 2012. 
could pose a limited challenge to the TNA in northern 
provincial elections.57  
“The EPDP has a solid base of support of about 20 per 
cent of the vote in the north. This is partly a factor of caste 
politics. Douglas has put a lot of work over the years into 
helping some of the discriminated castes in Jaffna. He’s 
generally a good ward politician”, said an analyst. In the 
longer-term, the Rajapaksa government will probably try 
to weaken, split and marginalise the TNA, while giving 
the EPDP enough material and institutional support to gain 
a bigger foothold. “Patronage politics will continue to eat 
into the Tamil polity slowly”, added another Tamil analyst.58 
B. TNA’S MODERATE APPROACH:  
YET TO BEAR FRUIT 
Since the end of the war, the TNA has made clear its will-
ingness to work with the government to address both the 
immediate needs of the war-affected population in the 
north and to negotiate a political settlement well short of 
the separate state for which the LTTE fought. Sampanthan 
has repeatedly said its goal is “a political solution within the 
framework of [a] united and undivided country that will 
enable the Tamil people to live in security and dignity, ful-
filling their legitimate political, economic, social and cul-
tural aspirations”.59 The TNA has deliberately kept private 
its specific vision of an acceptable solution to the conflict. 
Not wanting to box in itself or the government, it has pre-
ferred to speak in general principles, defining its goal as: 
… an acceptable durable and reasonable political solu-
tion to the Tamil question, based upon the sharing of 
powers of governance, which will ensure that the Tamil-
speaking people can live in security and with dignity, 
in the areas they have historically inhabited, and which 
will also ensure the fulfilment of their legitimate po-
litical, social, economic and cultural aspirations and 
rights, through their own initiatives, and without de-
pending upon the mercy of others.60 
 
57 The ruling United People’s Front Alliance (UPFA), with the 
EPDP in the lead, won just over half the vote in August 2009 
elections to the Jaffna municipal council. Turnout was very low, 
and the TNA and other opposition parties were not allowed to 
campaign freely. Feizal Samath and N. Parameswaran, “Mere 
18 percent turnout at Jaffna poll”, The Sunday Times, 9 August 
2009. 
58 Crisis Group telephone interview, Tamil academic, October 
2012; email correspondence, Tamil political analyst, October 
2012. 
59 R. Sampanthan, “Statement on the local authorities elections 
being held in the north east”, 18 July 2011. 
60 “Statement made by R. Sampanthan MP, parliamentary group 
leader Tamil National Alliance (TNA) and President Ilankai 
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One can hear in this echoes of the Thimpu principles, but 
stated in a way that leaves room for adjustment to current 
political realities, particularly the disproportionate power 
the government has to define the political terrain and the 
agenda for negotiations. 
1. Patience and compromise in negotiations61 
A year of negotiations with the government reached a 
standstill in late 2011. In the three-and-a-half years since 
the end of the war, the Rajapaksa administration has re-
peatedly broken promises to Tamil leaders and to the 
international community – including India and the U.S. 
– and displayed little interest in reaching agreement. It 
has consistently refused to formulate and present to the 
TNA or the public its own proposals for the devolution of 
power. 
Negotiations began in January 2011, after almost a year 
of intense pressure on President Rajapaksa from India, the 
U.S. and other states.62 The TNA tabled a full proposal for 
a political settlement in March, but the government pre-
sented nothing of its own.63 In frustration, the TNA broke 
 
Tamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) on the results of the local authori-
ties elections held in the North East”, 3 April 2011. 
61 Information for this section comes from Crisis Group inter-
views in 2011-2012 with diplomats and TNA members. A 
chronology laid out by TNA parliamentarian Sumanthiran has 
generally been confirmed by diplomats and others who have 
followed events closely; the government has not convincingly 
refuted it. See M.A. Sumanthiran, “Broken promises and the 
PSC”, Ceylon Today, 2 September 2012. For discussion of the 
first six months of negotiations, see Crisis Group Report, India 
and Sri Lanka, op. cit., pp. 12-14. For a valuable analysis of the 
government’s understanding of talks with the TNA, see 
Jayadeva Uyangoda, “South Africa can Play a Useful Role of 
Engagement with the Government and TNA”, dbsjeyaraj.com, 
4 September 2012. 
62 Following April 2010 parliamentary elections in which both 
the government and the TNA performed well, the TNA called 
on the government to begin negotiations on constitutional is-
sues and conditions in the north and east. After a series of false 
starts, these got off the ground on 10 January 2011. The gov-
ernment’s negotiating team has been led by Minister Nimal 
Siripala de Silva (known to be a proponent of devolution); it 
includes Foreign Minister G.L. Peiris (a constitutional scholar), 
and parliamentarians Sajin Vaas Gunawardena (a close confi-
dante of the president) and Rajiva Wijesinha. The TNA delega-
tion has comprised Sampanthan, General Secretary Mavai Sena-
thirajah and parliamentarians Suresh Premachandran and M.A. 
Sumanthiran. Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, August 2012. 
63 With no movement on constitutional issues, talks from April 
to August focused on TNA proposals to improve conditions for 
those recently resettled in the north, remove high security zones, 
disarm pro-government armed groups and release political 
prisoners and detainees. Other than reducing the size of high 
security zones in Jaffna, there was no progress. 
off talks on 4 August. On 11 August, the government tabled 
a motion in parliament to establish an all-party Parliamen-
tary Select Committee (PSC) tasked with developing con-
stitutional reforms “to enhance the unity of Sri Lanka”.64 
The move was seen by the TNA and most observers as a 
way for the government to avoid presenting proposals and 
further delay a solution.65 The TNA’s subsequent decision 
to withdraw from talks until the government presented pro-
posals was overwhelmingly supported by the Tamil com-
munity, but the party came under intense pressure from 
India and other influential states to return to the table.  
In the first of three significant and unrequited compro-
mises, the TNA agreed to return to talks on 14 September. 
This followed an agreement between the president and 
Sampanthan for bilateral discussions to resume on the ba-
sis of a set of constitutional proposals from earlier gov-
ernments. Once negotiators had reached consensus, the 
TNA would join the PSC, and the government-TNA con-
sensus position would be jointly presented to the commit-
tee as the basis for its discussions.66 Despite apparent pro-
gress in October and November, talks broke down again 
at the end of the year, when the government delegation 
demanded the TNA nominate its members to the PSC 
immediately. The government abruptly cancelled January 
2012 meetings scheduled to coincide with the visit of the 
Indian foreign minister.67 
Negotiations have remained suspended throughout 2012, 
with the government insisting the TNA join the PSC and 
begin all-party talks instead. The TNA has unsuccessfully 
offered two further compromises regarding PSC partici-
pation. In January, Sampanthan agreed to nominate mem-
bers simultaneously with the recommencement of bilateral 
 
64 The initial text of the proposed PSC mandate was to “rec-
ommend, within six months, appropriate political and constitu-
tional measures to enhance the unity of Sri Lanka, to empower 
the people to work as a nation, and to enable the people to take 
decisions and engage in actions towards their economic, social 
and political development”. “Addendum to the Order Book no. 
4 of Parliament”, 12 August 2011. 
65 Crisis Group interviews, diplomats and TNA politicians, Co-
lombo, June 2012. 
66 The agreement was finalised and recorded in minutes ex-
changed at a meeting between the negotiating teams on 16 Sep-
tember 2011. Crisis Group email correspondence, diplomat, 
August 2012. 
67 Meetings in October and November apparently narrowed 
disagreement to a few key issues, centring on TNA insistence 
that the northern and eastern provinces be remerged and pro-
vincial councils be given powers over land and policing, as 
well as expanded powers of taxation. Ibid, and Sumanthiran, 
“Broken promises”, op. cit. 
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talks, but on condition that PSC sessions would not begin 
until those talks had reached “substantial agreement”.68  
A second offer – and the third of the TNA’s compromises 
– was apparently accepted by the president in May, thanks 
to mediation by UNP leader Ranil Wickremasinghe, with 
Indian support.69 The UNP and TNA were to name their 
members, and the PSC would begin by focusing on the 
non-devolution related governance reforms recommended 
in the 2011 report of the government’s Lessons Learnt and 
Reconciliation Commission (LLRC).70 At the same time, 
TNA-government talks would resume on the set of earlier 
governments’ devolution proposals. Their eventual agree-
ment would be considered by the PSC. However, when 
the UNP leader presented the proposed agenda in parlia-
ment on 24 May, the government rejected it and called on 
the TNA and other opposition parties to join the PSC 
immediately, with no preconditions.71  
The government’s refusal to clarify its position on what 
powers should be devolved to the north and east comes 
despite repeated public assurances to UN, Indian, and 
U.S. officials that it would fully implement and then “go 
beyond” or “build on” the thirteenth amendment as the 
core of a lasting political solution. Among its better-known 
promises: 
 
68 Ibid. 
69 Wickremasinghe’s involvement reportedly came at the re-
quest of the government. Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, 
Colombo, June 2012. See also Raskia Jayakody, “President – 
Ranil agree on formula to persuade TNA”, Ceylon Today, 15 
May 2012.  
70 The LLRC, established in May 2010, was the government’s 
response to international calls for an investigation into allega-
tions of serious violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law in the final stages of the civil war. The com-
mission was undermined by a limited mandate and serious con-
flicts of interest in its composition. While its final report, re-
leased in December 2011, largely exonerated government forc-
es of war crimes, it contained sharp criticism of current govern-
ance practices and wide-ranging proposals for reforms. See 
Crisis Group’s “Statement on the Report of Sri Lanka’s Les-
sons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission”, 22 December 
2011. The report included a call for “maximum possible devo-
lution to the periphery especially at the grass roots level, as 
well as power sharing at the centre”, but its vision of devolution 
remained vague enough to be interpreted as endorsing both a 
strengthening and a weakening of powers granted under the 
thirteenth amendment. The full text of the report is available at 
http://slembassyusa.org/downloads/LLRC-REPORT.pdf. 
71 S. Marasinghe and I. Range, “Minister thanks UNP for sup-
porting PSC”, Daily News, 25 May 2012. For the text of the 
UNP leader’s speech to parliament, see “Parliamentary Debates 
(Hansard)”, vol. 208, no. 7, 24 May 2012, pp. 1065-1070. See 
also M.A. Sumanthiran, “Broken promises”, op. cit.  
 In a joint statement by the UN Secretary-General and 
President Rajapaksa, in Colombo on 26 May 2009, a 
week after the war’s end, “President Rajapaksa ex-
pressed his firm resolve to proceed with the implemen-
tation of the 13th Amendment, as well as to begin a 
broader dialogue with all parties, including the Tamil 
parties in the new circumstances, to further enhance this 
process and to bring about lasting peace and develop-
ment in Sri Lanka”.72  
 At the conclusion of a May 2011 visit to New Delhi 
by External Affairs Minister G.L. Peiris, the two gov-
ernments issued a joint statement in which “the Exter-
nal Affairs Minister of Sri Lanka affirmed his Gov-
ernment’s commitment to ensuring expeditious and 
concrete progress in the ongoing dialogue between the 
Government of Sri Lanka and representatives of Tamil 
parties. A devolution package, building upon the 13th 
Amendment, would contribute towards creating the 
necessary conditions for such reconciliation”.73 
 At the end of a January 2012 trip to Colombo, Indian 
External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna told journalists: 
“The Government of Sri Lanka has on many occasions 
conveyed to us its commitment to move towards a po-
litical settlement based on the full implementation of 
the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution, 
and building on it, so as to achieve meaningful devo-
lution of powers …. I discussed this matter with His 
Excellency the President this morning. The President 
assured me that he stands by his commitment to pursu-
ing the 13th Amendment-plus approach”.74 Two weeks 
later, however, President Rajapaksa denied ever prom-
ising the minister that his government would go beyond 
the thirteenth amendment. He added that all questions 
on constitutional reforms for “the national question” 
 
72 The next day, the UN Human Rights Council passed a reso-
lution largely drafted by the Sri Lankan government that “wel-
comed”, among other things, “the President of Sri Lanka’s … 
commitment to a political solution with implementation of the 
thirteenth amendment to bring about lasting peace and reconcil-
iation in Sri Lanka”. “Assistance to Sri Lanka in the promotion 
and protection of human rights”, UNHRC Resolution S-11/1, 
27 May 2009. 
73 www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=530517638, 17 May 2011. 
74 “Remarks by Hon’ble Minister of External Affairs of India 
Mr. S.M. Krishna at a Media Interaction”, Indian High Commis-
sion, Colombo, 17 January 2012. www.hcicolombo.org/index. 
php?option=com_news&task=detail&id=3354706. In a state-
ment to the upper house of the Indian parliament two months 
later, Krishna described things slightly differently, stating only 
that the Sri Lankan government had promised a political dia-
logue “leading to the full implementation of the 13th Amend-
ment to the Sri Lankan Constitution”. “Statement by Mr. S.M. 
Krishna, Hon’ble Minister of External Affairs of India, in the 
Rajya Sabha on ‘The Situation in Sri Lanka’”, 14 March 2012. 
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would be handled by the PSC, as he would be criticised 
for pre-empting parliament if he spelled out his views.75 
More serious doubts have been raised about the govern-
ment’s commitment to devolution by a series of statements 
from the president and other senior officials. In October 
2012, Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa called for 
the repeal of the thirteenth amendment, a call later taken 
up by Sinhalese nationalist parties in the governing coali-
tion.76 This followed a September Supreme Court ruling 
temporarily blocking legislation to establish a new govern-
ment department that would significantly reduce provin-
cial powers over welfare and development policy.77 The 
court’s ruling that the bill required approval by all pro-
vincial councils before it could be considered by parliament 
triggered a furious government response.78  
Apparently determined to eliminate the possibility of 
future obstruction by courts or provincial councils, the 
government has begun impeachment proceedings in par-
 
75 The denial was made in a meeting of Sri Lankan media exec-
utives. See Ravi Ladduwathy, “President denies promising India 
to go beyond 13-A”, Island, 31 January 2012. Rajapaksa also 
expressed his opposition to giving police powers to provinces.  
76 Shamindra Ferdinando “Repeal 13A without delay says Go-
tabhaya”, Island, 14 October 2012; Chandani Kirinde, “UPFA 
partners crank up opposition to 13th Amendment”, The Sunday 
Times, 28 October 2012. Senior Minister Basil Rajapaksa has 
also said the government is considering repeal. “Basil now 
speaks of 19 A”, Colombo Gazette, 24 October 2012. For a use-
ful overview of the controversy, see Dharisha Bastians, “From 
13 plus to 13 minus”, Financial Times, 25 October 2012. 
77 For details of how the “Divineguma” department would gain 
powers given to provinces by the thirteenth amendment, see 
“Notes on the Divineguma Bill”, Centre for Policy Alternatives, 
September 2012. Critics also charge that the bill grants too 
much power to the economic development ministry, headed by 
the president’s brother, Basil Rajapaksa, by bringing under its 
control a number of important and well-funded development 
and welfare agencies. A particular target of public criticism is a 
clause preventing employees of the new department from re-
leasing any information about its activities, unless required by a 
court. See Lasanda Kurukulasuriya, “Divineguma facilitates the 
concentration of power”, The Sunday Times, 30 September 2012. 
78 The president summoned the judicial services commission 
for a meeting, state media attacked the chief justice, and govern-
ment ministers, including Basil Rajapaksa, took part in public 
demonstrations against the decision. These actions, including 
an unprecedented public statement by the Judicial Services Com-
mission, were widely condemned as an assault on the already 
weakened independence of the judiciary. The secretary to the 
commission was denounced by the government and on 7 Octo-
ber attacked and badly beaten by armed men. “Sri Lanka’s Ju-
diciary: Enter the goons”, The Economist, 23 October 2012. A 
subsequent lawsuit by a TNA parliamentarian challenging the 
authority of the northern governor to approve the bill on behalf 
of the non-existent northern provincial council further upset the 
Rajapaksas. 
liament against the chief justice,79 while the president and 
senior officials are publicly calling for the replacement 
of the provincial council system, possibly through a new 
nineteenth amendment that would further weaken provin-
cial powers.80 Meanwhile, though three other elections 
have been held in the north since the end of the war, the 
president continues to resist holding elections to the north-
ern provincial council, despite repeated promises.81  
2. Other positive gestures 
Mindful of the need for international support, and coun-
selled by India and the U.S. not to give the government 
additional excuses to resist negotiations, TNA leaders have 
taken a number of other decisions designed to show mod-
eration and willingness to compromise. In early 2012, 
Sampanthan was under intense pressure from Tamils in-
side and outside Sri Lanka, including senior members of 
the TNA, to lobby in Geneva for a Human Rights Council 
resolution critical of the government.82 Not wishing to 
give the Rajapaksas opportunity to paint the TNA as trai-
tors in league with the “rump LTTE” in the diaspora, the 
TNA did not go.83 
A few months, later, Sampanthan again angered Tamil na-
tionalists when he waved Sri Lanka’s national “lion” flag 
at the party’s annual May Day rally in Jaffna, held jointly 
 
79 Krishan Francis, “Sri Lankan move to fire top judge stirs 
fears”, Associated Press, 9 November 2012. The motion to im-
peach the chief justice, signed by 118 UPFA legislators, was 
presented to parliament on the same day that Sri Lanka’s hu-
man rights record was under scrutiny at the UN Human Rights 
Council as part of the Universal Periodic Review process.  
80 In his annual budget speech to parliament on 8 November, 
the president called for “a change in the provincial council sys-
tem”. The economic development minister, Basil Rajapaksa, 
later announced that the government’s new provincial council 
system would be presented to the PSC in the form of a draft 
proposal for a nineteenth amendment. “19th amendment for new 
devolution package”, The Sunday Times, 11 November 2012. 
81 Crisis Group telephone interviews, diplomats, September 
2012. In an interview in July 2012, the president told an Indian 
journalist that the government is “working towards” holding 
elections in September 2013, but that new electoral rolls would 
be required first, as well as completion of the resettlement of 
internally displaced residents. R.K. Radhakrishnan, “Northern 
Province elections in September 2013, says Rajapaksa”, Hindu, 
11 July 2012.  
82 D.B.S. Jeyaraj, “‘Going to Geneva’: TNA in the eye of a po-
litical storm”, dbsjeyaraj.com, 9 March 2012. 
83 For the TNA statement on its decision, see “TNA won’t exac-
erbate tensions by attending UNHRC 19th sessions in Geneva”, 
dbsjeyaraj.com, 25 February 2012. Many Tamils in Sri Lanka 
and abroad criticised the decision, but some supporters main-
tained the party won points with the government and interna-
tionally by not going. Crisis Group telephone interview, Sep-
tember 2012. 
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in 2012 with the UNP and a coalition of smaller opposi-
tion parties. That flag, featuring a roaring lion said to rep-
resent the Sinhala people, has long been a symbol of Sin-
hala hegemony for many Tamils and Muslims. While many 
Tamils criticised the public acceptance of the flag, the 
gesture won grudging praise from some Sinhalese news-
papers and commentators, but no concrete government 
response.84 
3. No progress for Tamils in the north and east 
The TNA has also failed to win any concessions in the form 
of political normalisation in the north and east.85 Though 
the government says there has been significant demilitari-
sation of the northern province, the situation on the ground 
is very different.86 Troop levels appear to have been re-
duced in Jaffna, but not in the Vanni, where the military 
is omnipresent, with a dense network of checkpoints and 
camps, continues to attend local government and civil so-
ciety meetings and routinely interrogates those seen meet-
ing outsiders.87 The military still runs small shops in the 
 
84 Gamini Weerakoon, “Ranil and Sampanthan break through 
30 year barrier”, The Sunday Leader, 13 May 2012. 
85 For a detailed assessment of the problems facing Tamils due 
to government policies in the north, see Crisis Group Reports, 
Sri Lanka’s North I and North II, both op. cit. See also “No 
war, no peace: the denial of minority rights and justice in Sri 
Lanka”, Minority Rights Group International, 19 January 2011. 
86 See, for instance, the speech by Sri Lanka’s UN Geneva am-
bassador to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
stating that “the Security Forces presence in the Jaffna peninsu-
la has been reduced from 50,000 at the height of the conflict, to 
15,000 at present, and the military is no longer involved in civil 
administration in the Northern and Eastern provinces”. Ravina-
tha Ariyasinha, “Downplaying Sri Lanka’s post-conflict achieve-
ments, a disrespect to those who have suffered”, statement to 
the 63rd Session of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR, 2 
October 2012. The government has offered no figures for troop 
number in the rest of the north and east. According to a report 
based on documents presented by the army to an August 2012 
defence ministry seminar, there are at least 85,000 army troops 
in the north (not including navy or air force personnel or po-
lice). Nirupama Subramanian, “Sri Lankan Army still has vast 
presence in North & East”, The Hindu, 19 September 2012. 
Other analysts, using publicly available information put the 
figure between 150,000 and 200,000. Crisis Group interview, 
researcher, September 2012. 
87 “The military’s presence is not felt much in urban areas”, ex-
plained a northern-based NGO worker. “You won’t see them in 
Jaffna town, or very much in Kilinochchi town – not the way 
we used to see them. But then you step out of the towns and go 
just a few yards off the A-9 [highway], and you will see the 
military involvement …. The military is still going to civilian 
functions – to any government activity, especially in Kili and 
Mullaitivu”. Crisis Group telephone interview, September 
2012. A humanitarian worker in the Vanni reported that “any 
functions, ceremonies, weddings etc, also still need to be re-
ported in advance to the local level army personnel, and [inter-
Vanni, as well as larger businesses throughout the north 
and east.88 More importantly, both directly and via the presi-
dential task force for resettlement, development and secu-
rity in the north (PTF), it retains the greatest influence 
over how the north is being redeveloped and trans-
formed.89 
Military camps established since the end of the war have 
displaced thousands of Tamils and Muslims. Despite gov-
ernment insistence there are no more internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) in Sri Lanka,90 tens of thousands remain 
from the final years of the war, and many more tens of thou-
sands displaced prior to 2008 are still in camps or with 
families.91 The recent hurried closure of the once-massive 
Menik Farm IDP camp resulted in the forced relocation 
of hundreds of its final inmates to jungle land that lacks 
basic amenities, has not been properly demined and access 
to which is tightly controlled by the army.92 
The slow but steady process of Sinhalisation is also con-
tinuing, with new families reportedly arriving in the north-
east coastal town of Kokilai, and “an increasing number 
of Sinhalese officials being appointed to district and divi-
sion level government departments”.93 This ultimately 
threatens to change the demography, and with it the po-
litical dynamics, in the north. Fears that the Tamil charac-
ter of the north and remaining parts of the east are at risk 
were strengthened by Defence Secretary Gotabaya Raja-
 
national] NGOs still need to inform of any training programs 
planned several days in advance. It is rare to have a program 
happen without the military visiting”. Crisis Group email corre-
spondence, September 2012. 
88 An aid worker noted that while most directly military-owned 
shops have closed, some shops have opened next to the former 
outlets, so next to military bases, and are owned by Sinhalese 
families. Crisis Group email correspondence, September 2012. 
89 For details on the make-up and workings of the PTF, see Crisis 
Group Reports, Sri Lanka’s North I and North II, both op. cit. 
90 “No more IDPs in Sri Lanka – a lesson to be learnt by world 
countries”, northern province governor’s secretariat, press state-
ment, 28 September 2012. 
91 Humanitarian organisations in Sri Lanka estimate some 26,000 
are currently displaced by military camps, high-security zones 
and related development projects in the north and east. Crisis 
Group correspondence, September 2012.  
92 Crisis Group email correspondence, aid workers, September 
2012; also Dilrukshi Handunnetti, “Relocated to nowhere”, 
Ceylon Today, 29 September 2012, and Ruki, “Menik Farm: 
The tragic end of a bitter saga, from detention to forced reloca-
tion”, Groundviews.org, 2 October 2012. The families’ own 
land in the village of Kaeppapulavu is currently occupied by 
the army. For more on displacement from Kaeppapulavu, see 
Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s North II, op. cit., p. 19. 
93 Crisis Group email correspondence, aid worker, September 
2012. 
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paksa’s denial that the north should be treated as “a pre-
dominantly Tamil place”.94  
TNA calls to address the bitter legacy of the war have been 
ignored. There has been no progress on accountability for 
alleged war crimes, and the government has been unyield-
ing on less challenging issues as well, denying space for 
Tamils to mourn their dead publicly; refusing to make 
available a full list of detainees, as requested by families 
of the missing and disappeared; and denying the right of 
those in the north and east to sing the national anthem in 
Tamil.95  
C. TAMIL NATIONALIST CHALLENGES  
TO TNA AND THE SELF-DETERMINATION 
QUESTION  
Government policies in the north and east and delaying 
tactics in negotiations have denied the TNA any tangible 
benefits from its strategy of moderation and engagement. 
As a result, it comes under frequent criticism from more 
nationalist elements, both within Sri Lanka and outside. 
This could conceivably lead to the eventual fracturing of 
the party and a greater role for more radical, possibly sepa-
ratist groups in setting the direction of Tamil politics. The 
government might welcome both developments, believing 
it could more easily manipulate a divided Tamil polity as 
well as argue that it had no genuine and moderate Tamil 
leadership with which to engage. 
1. The Tamil diaspora and Tamil Nadu 
Feelings in the diaspora towards the TNA are mixed and 
frequently ambivalent. It is praised when it takes a tough 
stance and sharply criticised when it is seen to be too ac-
commodating or backing off from a strongly Tamil nation-
alist position. Many argue that it is unable to articulate the 
true feelings of the Tamil people given the high levels of 
threat faced by critics of the government or anyone seen 
as pro-LTTE.96 
 
94 Charles Haviland, “Gotabhaya Rajapaksa: Sri Lanka north 
‘not just for Tamils’”, BBC News, 28 May 2012. A former 
Sinhala government official warned: “What Gota is doing on 
the ground, through the military and Sinhala GAs [district sec-
retaries], including Sinhalisation, is dangerous. Road-building 
is to facilitate carpet-bagging, it’s not for local people. It’s like 
building railroads to the U.S. west – that wasn’t for the benefit 
of Native Americans”. Crisis Group interview, June 2012. 
95 On all three issues, the LLRC report recommended new poli-
cies the government has not implemented. 
96 The sixth amendment to the constitution, adopted in 1983, 
makes it illegal for any individual or organisation to “support, 
espouse, promote, finance, encourage or advocate the estab-
lishment of a separate State within the territory of Sri Lanka”. 
The Global Tamil Forum (GTF) has been the only major 
diaspora organisation to offer public support to the TNA, 
describing it as “the elected representatives of the Tamil 
people in Sri Lanka” and approving its attempt to nego-
tiate “a durable, and dignified political solution to the 
National Question”.97 The influential website Tamilnet 
frequently criticises the TNA for moderation allegedly im-
posed by the Indian and U.S. governments.98 It also pro-
vides regular and positive coverage to domestic Tamil na-
tionalist critics, particularly those associated with the TNPF. 
More generally, major diaspora voices, while not always 
openly critical, advocate very different, explicitly separatist 
policies. The Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam 
(TGTE), headed by former LTTE-adviser V. Rudrakuma-
ran, is dedicated to “establish[ing] an independent state of 
Tamil Eelam”, and focuses much of its efforts on an in-
ternational investigation into war crimes and what it claims 
is an ongoing “genocide” in Sri Lanka.99 With many pro-
Eelam groups in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, it supports 
a UN-organised plebiscite for Tamils in the north and east 
to determine whether “Eelam Tamils” wish to establish 
their own state or remain within Sri Lanka.100 Demands 
for investigations into alleged genocide and for a separate 
state of Tamil Eelam are at the core of demands of a grow-
ing number of Tamil activist groups throughout the world.101 
A similar agenda is at the centre of increasingly vocal and 
aggressive activism in Tamil Nadu. Concern with the 
 
97 “Global Tamil Forum on government of Sri Lanka and Tamil 
National Alliance ‘talks”, press statement, 14 January 2012. 
According to the spokesman, Suren Surendiran, “we don’t pre-
scribe a solution, because we don’t think we have the expertise 
or the knowledge or the right to prescribe to Tamils in Sri Lanka 
what they should do; but we do have a role and a responsibility 
to play, since we wouldn’t be the diaspora except for what hap-
pened in Sri Lanka, which made us leave. But the TNA is 
elected and is there and has the right to propose solutions”. Cri-
sis Group interview, London, September 2012. 
98 See, for instance, “TNA relays US-India paradigm for ‘non-
descript’ model of solutions”, TamilNet, 7 November 2011.  
99 In a jointly-issued statement commemorating “the third anni-
versary of the genocidal events that the Tamils had to endure in 
Mullivaaikkaal”, the TGT and GTF called for “an international 
and independent investigation on the events of Mullivaakik-
kaal”. “Mullivaaikkaal remembrance message”, 17 May 2012. 
100 Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran, “Diaspora Tamils should be 
part of UN referendum on Eelam”, The Weekend Leader, 3 
April 2012. 
101 See, for instance, “Pongku Thamizh event in Geneva urges 
global Tamils to uphold struggle”, TamilNet, 23 September 
2012. The rally prominently featured the LTTE flag. Events in 
various European and Canadian cities commemorating the third 
anniversary of the end of the war were visually and rhetorically 
reminiscent of LTTE-organised events. See, for instance, “In-
dependent international investigation on Sri Lanka called for at 
London event”, TamilNet, 20 May 2012. 
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situation of Tamils in Sri Lanka has grown since the 2011 
return to power of Chief Minister Jayalalithaa and her 
AIADMK party.102 The state government has urged New 
Delhi to increase pressure on the Rajapaksa government 
on a range of issues, including alleged war crimes and the 
continued hardships faced by Tamils in the north and east. 
It has interceded to block training of Sri Lankan military 
personnel in Tamil Nadu and even sent back a visiting 
sports team.103 Jayalalithaa’s long-time rival, M. Karuna-
nidhi, has tried not to be outdone, resurrecting his defunct 
Tamil Eelam Supporters’ Organisation (TESO), regularly 
criticising mistreatment of Tamils by the Sri Lankan gov-
ernment and expressing support for a separate state of 
Tamil Eelam.104  
Civil society activism has focused on charges of genocide. 
Many of the most active groups and leaders were sympa-
thetic to the LTTE, and demands for accountability gener-
ally ignore alleged LTTE war crimes.105 Physical attacks 
by pro-Eelam protestors on Sri Lankan Christian pilgrims 
visiting Tamil Nadu in September 2012 provoked a sharp 
reaction from Colombo and strengthened the longstanding 
sense of threat many Sinhalese feel from Tamil Nadu.106 
2. Domestic Tamil critics 
The main but still relatively weak challenge to the TNA 
within Sri Lanka comes from an informal collection of 
Tamil nationalist civil society activists who periodically 
write it open letters, as well as those associated with the 
TNPF, led by former TNA parliamentarian Gajen Pon-
nambalam.107 Criticisms from both, which in turn are 
widely echoed in the diaspora, focus on three main points. 
 
102 Sri Lankan Tamil issues in Tamil Nadu have for decades been 
shaped by the rivalry between Jayalalithaa’s All India Anna 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) and M. Karunandhi’s 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK). See Crisis Group Re-
port, India and Sri Lanka, op. cit. 
103 See Nita Bhalla, “Rage in India spotlights Sri Lanka’s war 
victims”, Reuters, 7 September 2012. 
104 TESO held the “Eelam Tamils’ Rights Protection Confer-
ence” in August 2012. “TESO meet says India cannot remain 
silent on Sri Lanka”, The Hindu, 13 August 2012. 
105 See, for instance, D.B.S. Jeyaraj, “Tamil Resurgence Week 
in Tamil Nadu organized by Seeman will focus on LTTE armed 
struggle”, dbsjeyaraj.com, 21 November 2011. 
106 “Buses carrying Sri Lankan pilgrims attacked in Tamil Na-
du: Reports”, Times of India, 4 September 2012. 
107 The TNPF, running as the ACTC, received only 7,544 votes 
in the 2010 parliamentary elections and poses no electoral 
threat to the TNA. Best known member of the “Tamil civil so-
ciety” group is the outspoken Catholic bishop of Mannar, 
Rayappu Joseph. The group’s positions are said to have some 
support within the TNA, including from Vanni member of par-
liament Sritharan. Crisis Group telephone interviews, Tamil 
activists and political analysts, September 2012. 
Preserving the nationalist fundamentals. The TNA’s 
nationalist critics accuse it of watering down or abandon-
ing the core of the nationalist movement – the quest for 
the recognition of the Tamil nation and its right to self-
determination in a merged north and east, the “traditional 
homelands”. They argue that attempts to engage with the 
government from anything but an explicitly nationalist po-
sition, including any acceptance of the thirteenth amend-
ment, are bound to fail and play into the hands of a govern-
ment they believe is seeking to destroy the Tamil nation.108  
The civil society groups say that self-determination does 
not necessarily require a separate state. It does require, 
however, a clear statement that Tamils are not a “minor-
ity” deserving “equal rights”, but rather a nation deserv-
ing “a measure of self-governance”.109 TNPF leader Pon-
nambalam explains that political engagement needs to: 
… start from the premise that Tamils have the right to 
govern ourselves. We had that right before and did gov-
ern ourselves and then lost that right under colonialism. 
Yes, we can consider alternatives to separation. There’s 
no reason not to explore these other options, but this 
must be done on the basis of accepting this sovereignty, 
so that we freely choose to join in and choose to come 
together and be governed together with the Sinhalese.110 
Basic nationalist principles have, for these groups, two 
crucial corollaries: 
Negotiating with the government. This is acceptable 
only so long as the aim is to go beyond the thirteenth 
amendment and the unitary state. There is no point in it if 
the re-merger of the north and east and land and police 
powers for a north-eastern provincial council are off the 
table.111 Talks with no hope of progress on these points 
 
108 “A permanent political solution can only be attained by rec-
ognising the right to self-determination of the Tamil people and 
by recognising Tamil Nationhood. … There is no point in a po-
litical process that refuses to acknowledge the above”, “Tamil 
civil society memo to the TNA regarding the Eastern Provincial 
Council elections”, Groundviews.org, 29 July 2011. 
109 “To say that Tamils are a nation entitled to self-determina-
tion does not mean that we seek a separate country. We can ne-
gotiate the institutional form that will satisfy our aspirations at 
the negotiating table”. “A public memo to members of parlia-
ment representing the Tamil National Alliance from the Tamil 
civil society”, 13 December 2011. 
110 Crisis Group telephone interview, August 2012. “Without 
the explicit recognition of nationhood, there won’t be any safe-
guards to prevent a future government taking things away 
without the consent of the Tamil peoples themselves. Recogni-
tion of Tamils’ nationhood would prevent Colombo’s unilateral 
action …. Devolutionary power means by definition that the 
centre can take back powers. It’s different when it’s distinct na-
tions first coming together to negotiate”. 
111 “A public memo”, op. cit. 
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allow the government to appear open to a solution even as 
it gains more time to implement destructive policies in the 
north and east.  
Provincial council elections. For similar reasons, the 
TNA should refuse to contest elections to the northern 
provincial council – and should have refused to contest in 
the eastern provinces in September 2012, as it had in 2008. 
The provincial councils have no meaningful powers, and 
no political solution can be found from within, or build-
ing on, the thirteenth amendment, which is an element of 
the unitary state. By contesting such elections, the TNA 
gives legitimacy to the thirteenth amendment, the unitary 
state and the legal separation of the two provinces.112  
3. A shift in tone? Return to the language of  
self-determination 
In part because of pressure from the TNPF and nationalist 
civil society activists, but also frustration with government 
policies, 2012 has seen a noticeable shift in TNA strategy. 
The party has begun to engage more regularly in public 
protests in the north and east, particularly over land issues. 
These included a June protest in the town of Tellipallai that 
was obstructed by police and later attacked by government 
supporters,113 and a September protest against military 
seizure of land in Kaeppapulavu, Mullaitivu at which TNA 
parliamentarians joined TNPF and local activists.114  
 
112 “Tamil civil society memo to the TNA”, op. cit. The group 
argues that “the TNA taking over the Northern Provincial Coun-
cil will be a ‘political Mullivaayakal’”, referring to where the 
war’s last battles were fought and tens of thousands killed. To 
resist this temptation “is a historical duty placed on the shoul-
ders of the TNA”. “A public memo”, op. cit. For the TNPF’s 
more nuanced criticisms, see “TNA should reject PC model, 
field independents in East elections: TNPF”, TamilNet, 15 July 
2012. To prevent pro-government parties – especially the 
EPDP – from controlling the northern council, nationalist crit-
ics argue that independents could contest the elections instead 
of the TNA. “Once in office”, explained an activist, “they would 
pursue a 100-day program of action to test what is actually pos-
sible through the provincial council. If the program doesn’t 
work, there would be a mass resignation. This is the platform 
they would run on, which would be clearly explained to the peo-
ple”. Crisis Group interview, Colombo, June 2012. The TNPF 
has made similar proposals. See “TNA should reject PC model”, 
op. cit. 
113 “President petitioned to resettle IDPs in their own lands 
within HSZ”, The Sunday Times, 24 June 2012. 
114 “Ki’linochchi rises up against resettlement farce and SL mil-
itary occupation”, Tamilnet, 28 September 2012.The military’s 
seizure of land in Kaeppapulavu was discussed in Crisis Group 
Report, Sri Lanka’s North II, op. cit., p. 19. The TNA’s deci-
sion to join demonstrations with civil society and TNPF critics 
suggests both a perceived need to respond better to pressure 
There has also been a shift in the tone and language with 
which senior leaders articulate their policies and goals. The 
best known and widely-remarked example is the May 2012 
speech Sampanthan, in his capacity as leader of ITAK, 
gave to the national party convention in the eastern town 
of Batticaloa.115 The speech, an English language transla-
tion of which was widely distributed by the TNA, sparked 
heated debate and led to widespread criticism from many 
Sinhalese commentators. Both the content and the strong 
reactions it produced reveal the severe political pressures 
on the TNA, caught as it is between the triumphalist Sin-
hala nationalism of the government and the continued 
hold of strong versions of Tamil nationalism among many 
Tamils.  
From the beginning of the speech, Sampanthan reasserted 
the central message of Tamil nationhood, sovereignty and 
self-determination. He reminded his audience that ITAK 
was “was created … for the purpose of establishing self- 
determination of the Tamil people on this island .… Up to 
500 years ago, the Tamil people established their own gov-
ernments, and governed themselves”.116 As a result, the 
“solution to the ethnic problem” requires that Tamils be 
given “unrestricted authority to govern our own land, pro-
tect our own people, and develop our own economy, cul-
ture and tradition” in “the areas of historical habitation of 
the Tamil-speaking people” in the north and east.  
But while meaningful devolution should go beyond the 
thirteenth amendment and the unitary state, he said, “we 
have clearly asked for a solution within a united Sri Lanka, 
and we are committed to the achievement of such a goal. 
This solution must be reasonable, acceptable, realistic, 
and permanent”. Since “the destruction of the [LTTE’s] 
bargaining might”, Sampanthan argued:  
… the only hope [the Tamil people] has is the interest 
and involvement of the international community117 …. 
 
from below and new-found confidence to confront the govern-
ment and military even on extremely sensitive issues. 
115 Batticaloa is the stronghold of the pro-government TMVP. 
The hall for Sampathan’s speech had to be changed at the last 
minute, as the original location was reportedly firebombed days 
earlier. D.B.S. Jeyaraj, “Sampanthan and Senathirajah re-elected 
in B’Caloa as President and Gen Secy of ITAK”, dbsjeyaraj. 
com, 27 May 2012. 
116 He added: “Our party symbolises a time in history, until the 
entire country was, for administrative convenience, ruled as one 
Nation by colonial powers, during which our people had their 
own sovereign Tamil governments”. This and the following 
quotations are from R. Sampanthan, “Speech to Fourteenth An-
nual ITAK Convention”, Batticaloa, 27 May 2012. The full 
English translation from the original Tamil text is available at 
http://tnamediaoffice.blogspot.co.uk/. 
117 Sampanthan hailed “our victory in the passage of the recent 
Resolution at the UN Human Rights Council”, which he termed 
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Exasperated by the failure of the Sri Lankan govern-
ment to fulfil its promises three years after the conclu-
sion of the war, the international community has begun 
to exert diplomatic pressure on the government. Now 
is the time to be patient … [and] act with caution …. 
If the world begins to perceive us to be extremist, or 
too rigid, or if they believe that we have a hidden 
agenda to reignite violence, we will soon be ostracised 
from the diplomatic exercises in progress. 
Nonetheless, he warned, patience would not last forever. 
“[I]n the event our right to internal self-determination is 
continuously denied”, Tamils retain the option to “claim 
our right under international law to external self-deter-
mination”. Today, however, remaining within a united Sri 
Lanka “is the only realistic solution”. 
In most ways, Sampanthan’s speech was a moderate re-
statement of longstanding policy, especially when viewed 
in light of the TNA’s current difficult situation and his 
need to speak simultaneously to multiple, conflicting con-
stituencies. “You need to see the speech in the context of 
the pressures he’s under from more nationalist Tamils”, 
said a TNA adviser. “It was Sampanthan’s response to his 
Tamil critics, who say the government has never given 
Tamils anything and that the TNA is just another in a long 
line of Tamil parties who will be duped”.118 The references 
to the continued possibility of “external self-determina-
tion” should be understood in light of the continued ap-
peal of a separate state for many within ITAK, the TNA 
and Tamils as a whole.119 He and other moderate TNA 
members are not strong enough at present to reject this 
option outright unless the government offers a tangible 
alternative. 
Yet, the speech counselled patience and caution and con-
tained a clear and repeated commitment to non-violence.120 
 
“a condemnation against the Sri Lankan government by the in-
ternational community”. He argued that “India’s vote in sup-
port of the [March 2012] Resolution presented by the United 
States at the UN Human Rights Council was an astonishing in-
ternational development in our favour. This can only be seen as 
[an] indication of future developments”. 
118 Crisis Group telephone interview, October 2012. 
119 See, for instance, the interview in which S. Sritharan, TNA 
parliamentarian representing the Vanni, made clear his contin-
ued support for a separate state of Tamil Eelam. “‘Statements 
may be made by leaders but Eeelam is our ultimate goal’– 
Sivagnanam Shritharan MP”, dbsjeyaraj.com, 11 June 2012. 
120 Tamils have learned, Sampanthan argued, that “it is not real-
istic for the Tamil people to resort to violent political struggle. 
… [a] struggle that runs counter to the values of the interna-
tional community, built only on military might, will not pre-
vail”. Moreover, ITAK has gained international recognition in 
part because it “does not have any history of armed struggle, … 
has always rejected such struggle, … has a longtime democratic 
It also contained a strong and direct message to the Tamil 
diaspora that it must “respect the political thinking of 
those living here”, and its “political initiatives, and public 
statements on behalf of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka 
must not negatively affect the situation here”.121 
What was otherwise a skilful and politically nuanced 
speech, however, had one major – and for many commen-
tators – fatal flaw. Speaking of the need to “expose the 
Sri Lankan government that for so many years in the past 
attempted to describe the ethnic problem as a ‘terrorist 
problem’”, Sampanthan argued in a brief passage that 
Tamils “must prove to the international community that 
we will never be able to realise our rights within a united 
Sri Lanka .… [T]he international community must realise 
through its own experience, without us having to tell them, 
that the racist Sri Lankan government will never come 
forward and give political power to the Tamil people in a 
united Sri Lanka”.122 For many Sinhalese commentators, 
this passage was the real message to his Tamil constitu-
ency and the assurances of moderation and compromise 
simply cover for the real project, which remains the quest 
for a separate state. 
From this perspective, the opening call for self-determi-
nation takes on a threatening character, as it is no longer a 
question of whether, but when the demand will shift from 
internal to external self-determination; together, the two 
passages are seen as making clear what Sampanthan had 
in mind when he stated: “The current practices of the inter-
national community may give us an opportunity to achieve, 
without the loss of life, the soaring aspirations we were 
unable to achieve by armed force”. On this reading, the 
LTTE’s separatist goal is alive and well. The repeated em-
phasis on the need to keep the international community on 
the Tamil side only confirms the fears of Sinhala nation-
alists, who have long complained that Tamil separatism 
has relied on international, especially Western, support.123 
 
tradition, [and] … has always put forward realistic proposals”. 
Nonetheless, Sampanthan refrained from directly criticising the 
LTTE and was careful to “remember the Tamil youth who sac-
rificed their lives in armed struggle, which they resorted to on 
the failure of their peaceful struggle for the political rights and 
freedoms of their people”, “Speech”, op. cit. 
121 “It is the efforts that are made by the people in Sri Lanka, 
which are made in accordance with the situation in Sri Lanka, 
and with sensitivity to this situation, that will finally bring about 
concrete results for the Tamil Nation”, ibid.  
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. Sinhalese commentators also cite this passage: “The 
softening of our stance concerning certain issues, and the com-
promise we show in other issues, are diplomatic strategies to 
ensure that we do not alienate the international community. They 
are no[t] indications that we have abandoned our fundamental 
objectives”, ibid. An editorial in the widely-read Daily Mirror, 
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Sinhala nationalists were quick to denounce the speech. A 
prominent Buddhist monk and parliamentarian with the 
Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) was quoted as saying: “What 
Sampanthan is now trying to do is to achieve by peaceful 
means what Prabhakaran [the late LTTE leader] could not 
achieve through guns, bombs, terror, and bloodshed. He 
aims for nothing but a separate state .… He is a traitor 
and should be treated as such”. The leader of the Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), Somawansa Amarasinghe, 
saw the speech as evidence that the TNA “are gradually 
moving towards their goal of forming a separate state”.124  
The severe political and rhetorical constraints the TNA is 
forced to work within were brought out especially clearly 
by the reaction of Sri Lanka’s ambassador to France and 
Spain, the outspoken political analyst Dayan Jayatilleka. 
Known as a proponent of the thirteenth amendment, he 
launched a series of broadsides against Sampanthan and 
the party after publication of the speech, arguing that it was 
now “far too risky to transfer provincial powers through 
an election to a party which openly declares that it not 
only dismisses the 13th amendment as a solution; but also 
dismisses the unitary state as a framework and actually 
believes that a solution is not possible within a united Sri 
Lanka”. This was especially so, he said, because the north-
ern province lies on Sri Lanka’s “strategic frontier, across 
which is a historically – and increasingly – hostile element”: 
ie, the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.125 
 
while criticising the government for still not treating Tamils in 
the north and east as equal citizens, was sharply critical of 
Sampanthan’s repeated appeal for international support. “[T]he 
ITAK is shrewd”, it wrote. “The LTTE lacked the diplomacy, 
through which the ITAK now seeks ‘foreign aid’, begging the 
international powers to intervene in the home affairs. During 
the times of kings, those who induced external interferences 
were called traitors”. “Editorial – Let the facts be facts”, Daily 
Mirror, 31 May 2012. 
124 “Understanding Sampanthan’s utterances”, The Nation, 17 
June 2012. Sinhala nationalist diaspora groups joined in, with 
one condemning Sampanthan’s “provocative, divisive and du-
plicitous statements”. “Sri Lanka, One Country for All – SPUR 
Responds to Sampanthan’s Divisive ITAK Speech”, Society for 
Peace, Unity and Human Rights for Sri Lanka (SPUR), 24 June 
2012. A Sinhala columnist questioned Sampanthan’s and the 
TNA’s honesty: “It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
Sampanthan tends to say different things to different audienc-
es”. Lasanda Kurukulasuriya, “Sampanthan’s speech and the 
reconciliation roadblock”, The Sunday Times, 3 June 2012. 
125 Dayan Jayatilleka, “The ‘autonomist-secessionist continu-
um’ in Tamil politics”, Groundviews.org, 3 June 2012; “Policy 
pivot: A two stage solution”, Island, 26 June, 2012. Jayatilleka 
had supported northern provincial council elections soon after 
the war’s end. He explained his change of heart in “Tamil self-
determination or minority rights”, Colombo Telegraph, 21 July 
2012.  
Like most Sinhalese analysts, Jayatilleka rejects TNA 
claims of Tamil nationhood and self-determination, argu-
ing they are “a national minority, or at most, a minority 
nationality”, and a self-determination right is only the Sri 
Lankan people’s as a whole.126 Continued references by 
TNA leaders to the possibility they might invoke the right 
of secession if adequate powers are not offered within a 
united Sri Lanka, he says, are far from reassuring.127 Even 
the TNA’s more modest demands prove to him that it is 
anything but moderate. Going beyond the unitary state 
would require a two-thirds vote in parliament and a ma-
jority vote in a referendum – both difficult and possibly 
explosive hurdles. Tamils, he argues, are in no political 
position to make such demands, given the continued 
popularity and power of the president and the potency of 
Sinhalese fears of separatism. He warns of the risks in 
provoking even more nationalist and violent forces than 
those presently in power. The best Tamils can get now, and 
possibly ever, he says, is devolution within the unitary 
state, most likely in the form of the only partially imple-
mented thirteenth amendment.128  
 
126 Dayan Jayatilleka, “Tamil self-determination or minority 
rights”, Colombo Telegraph, 21 July 2012. As Kalana 
Seneratne pointed out in his valuable contribution to the debate, 
Jayatilleka thought otherwise in his 1995 book, Sri Lanka: The 
Travails of a Democracy, Unfinished War, Protracted Crisis, 
where he endorsed the right to self-determination of the Tamil 
nation. See Kalana Seneratne “ITAK and the New Chapter in 
Post-War Politics of Sri Lanka”, Groundviews.org, 9 June, 
2012. 
127 Dayan Jayatilleka, “A critique of political fundamentalism 
in Sri Lanka”, Groundviews.org, 3 August 2012. Jayatilleka 
also criticised the TNA’s M.A. Sumanthiran and his reference 
to international law to defend the Tamil nation’s right to self-
determination. Citing in particular a 1996 Canadian Supreme 
Court judgment on Quebec, Sumanthiran wrote: “The Tamil 
People in Sri Lanka have been subjected to discrimination within 
the model of a unitary state where they have been denied the 
right to express their right to self-determination within an inter-
nal arrangement, such as a federal government. In such a situa-
tion the continued denial of the existence of the right to self-
determination itself may give rise to the right to unilateral se-
cession as an expression of that right …. Thus it is a sine qua 
non that the right to self-determination of the Tamil People is 
recognised and the nature of the state is restructured to enable 
meaningful exercise of internal self-determination if the right to 
external self-determination is to be avoided”. M.A. Sumanthi-
ran, “Self-determination: Myth and reality”, Ceylon Today, 29 
July 2012. 
128 Dayan Jayatilleka, “A critique of political fundamentalism 
in Sri Lanka”, op. cit. Citing the growing calls to repeal the 
thirteenth amendment, Jayatillika argued: “There’s still space 
for Sinhala politicians to move further rightward. The TNA 
doesn’t seem to understand this”. Crisis Group telephone inter-
view, October 2012. 
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Such arguments miss two points central to the positions 
of TNA leaders and other more nationalist Tamils. First, 
the unitary state has been used to deny Tamils even the 
most basic form of political autonomy, which in turn has 
directly contributed to the denial of a broad range of basic 
democratic and human rights and to support among many 
Tamils for a separate state. Secondly, current constitu-
tional arrangements have no place for “recognising 
[Tamils’] status as a distinct people”,129 equal in status to 
Sinhalese. Until the legal and constitutional order is rear-
ranged to address these issues, Tamils are certain to de-
mand much more, and the appeal of separation will re-
main powerful for many of them. That said, it remains 
questionable whether the language of self-determination – 
particularly when its external version is maintained as an 
option – is the most politically effective one with which to 
make these points. Its ambiguities, and the fears it pro-
vokes among Sinhalese, provide significant ammunition 
for attacks by Jayatilleka and others.  
 
129 M.A. Sumanthiran, “Self-determination: Myth and reality”, 
Ceylon Today, 29 July 2012. 
IV. THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT: 
BUILDING BLOCK OR STUMBLING 
BLOCK? 
A. THE PRO-DEVOLUTION CASE AGAINST  
THE AMENDMENT  
From its beginning, there has been virtual unanimity among 
Tamil politicians and intellectuals, as well as many con-
stitutional experts and reform-minded Sinhalese, that the 
thirteenth amendment is inadequate, and deeper devolu-
tion is needed. Most Tamil nationalists have rejected the 
amendment on the grounds that it is locked into a unitary 
and centralised state, so can offer no legal recognition of or 
power to the Tamil nation or Tamil speakers. Even Tamil 
allies of the government like the EPDP and staunchly anti-
LTTE politicians like TULF’s Anandasangaree have re-
peatedly called for devolution to go beyond the amendment 
in the form of a federal or quasi-federal system such as 
India’s.130  
The thirteenth amendment, as interpreted by the courts and 
implemented by parliamentary legislation, seems to confirm 
the arguments of its Tamil and pro-devolution critics.131  
Supremacy of the unitary state. In a response to legal 
challenges when the amendment was first submitted to 
parliament in 1987, the Supreme Court determined that it 
would function within the strict limits of the unitary state. 
As a result, none of powers granted to provinces are per-
manent or complete; the president and parliament have 
numerous ways to control, override and manage provin-
cial councils and administrations. To grant the provinces 
the substantial powers desired by Tamil nationalists or 
federalists would require either a new constitution that re-
moves the unitary definition of the state or a constitutional 
amendment approved by national plebiscite and two-thirds 
of the parliament. 
Delegation, not devolution. The Supreme Court ruling 
subordinating provincial institutions to the central gov-
ernment means that legislative and administrative powers 
are delegated, not devolved. Provincial powers can be 
suspended or taken back by parliament at any time with-
out consultation with or approval by a province. The 
president also has wide, if temporary, powers to intervene 
in and even take over the functioning of provincial coun-
cils. As a Sri Lankan constitutional scholar concluded, 
 
130 “‘I’m an ahinsaka kolla’ – Douglas Devananda”, Lakbima 
News, 28 August 2011.  
131 For a more detailed critique of the limitations of the amend-
ment and the provincial council system, see Appendix C. 
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“there is a glaring impermanency of the powers given un-
der the 13th Amendment”.132 
Limited and ambiguous legislative power. The amend-
ment demarcates three categories of legislative subjects: 
the provincial list, on which provincial councils have sole 
power to legislate; the reserved list, on which only par-
liament can make law; and the concurrent list, on which 
both can legislate. In practice, provincial councils have not 
been able to claim exclusive competence even over areas 
on the provincial list, as parliament has found a variety of 
means to legislate on provincial topics. Councils have also 
been largely unable to exercise their concurrent powers, 
thanks to political obstruction from the centre and lack of 
administrative resources. 
The governor. This official, as agent of the president, has 
the power to obstruct or override decisions of the provin-
cial council. He can delay, challenge and influence the 
writing of provincial statutes and summon, prorogue or dis-
solve the council. He controls the appointment, transfer, 
dismissal and disciplining of officers of the provincial 
public service and has extensive financial powers, including 
de facto veto power over provincial expenditures. 
Minimal financial independence and resources. Pro-
vincial councils have very limited powers of taxation and 
no borrowing powers. They consequently depend almost 
entirely on allocations from the central government. 
With such severe limitations on provincial autonomy, rooted 
in the unitary nature of the state, it is highly doubtful the 
thirteenth amendment can satisfy Tamil aspirations. It has 
not given meaningful power to the provinces, and need-
ing to please more senior figures in Colombo, provincial 
leaders generally have not seen it in their interest to de-
mand more.133  
The difficulties faced by the first-ever eastern provincial 
council, elected in 2008, are revealing. Headed by a Tamil 
chief minister and with mainly Tamil and Muslim members, 
its majority nonetheless was made up of parties aligned with 
the government.134 Its modest attempts to assert independ-
ence were obstructed by Colombo, which often worked 
through the aggressive Sinhalese governor, a retired sen-
ior military officer. He delayed by four months the first 
legislation (to enact basic financial statutes) and blocked 
 
132 Lakshman Marasinghe, “The Thirteenth Amendment”, in 
13th Amendment: Essays on Practice, in Lakshman Marasinghe 
and Jayampathy Wickremaratne (eds.), (Colombo, 2010), p. 6.  
133 This is one reason the central government has been able to 
get away with not granting police and land powers. 
134 For more on the political dynamics of the eastern province at 
the time of the formation of its first provincial council in 2008, 
see Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province, op. cit. 
the creation of a separate Chief Minister’s Fund.135 Rela-
tions were so bad by mid-2009 that the ministers sent the 
president a list of their grievances against the governor’s 
interference. Some were reportedly in favour of formally 
requesting the president to remove the governor, but in the 
absence of unanimity and in fear of angering the centre, 
the idea was abandoned.136 
Fear of going counter to the wishes of the centre can also 
be seen in another aborted initiative of the council. The 
chief minister repeatedly stated his desire to claim the 
partial powers over policing and law and order granted by 
the thirteenth amendment. A draft police statute drawn up 
in October 2010 was dropped, however, once the central 
government made clear its opposition to any province as-
suming such powers. On the other hand, the council’s ex-
pected objection to the draft local authorities bill in 2010 
was enough to dissuade the central government from pre-
senting it to parliament – a rare case of a provincial council 
blocking legislation.137 It was not repeated in the case of 
the controversial 2012 Divineguma bill; provincial coun-
cils – all controlled by the ruling UPFA coalition – agreed 
to the centre recovering certain provincial powers. 
Should the TNA eventually take control of the northern 
provincial council, it would likely face similar interference 
from the governor, another strong-willed retired general. 
The council might, with skill and patience, be able to pass 
some statutes, but given the many ways the president and 
parliament have to obstruct or undermine a council’s auton-
omy, the contest would be fought on very uneven terms. 
B. FROM STUMBLING BLOCK TO  
BUILDING BLOCK? 
Tamil nationalists and many constitutional scholars reject 
the possibility of building on the thirteenth amendment 
for understandable reasons.138 Yet, despite the limited and 
 
135 See Welikala, “Devolution within the Unitary State”, op. cit. 
The bill for a Chief Minister’s Fund (a standard practice in pro-
vincial councils) was passed by the council in February 2009 
and sent back to the council by the governor for amendments 
the next month. When the council passed it again, the governor 
sent it to the president in July 2009 for referral to the Supreme 
Court. It has not been heard of since, despite the chief minister 
requesting a status update from the governor. Jayampathy 
Wickramaratne, “The Constitutional Framework”, in Twenty 
Two Years of Devolution, in Ranjith Amarasinghe et al. (eds.), 
(Colombo, 2010), p. 28. 
136 Welikala, “Devolution within the Unitary State”, op. cit., pp. 
60-62. Ministers were also angry at the governor’s regular inter-
ference in appointments to jobs in the provincial administration. 
137 Ibid, pp. 41-42 and 30. 
138 In the words of the Tamil civil society group, “‘incremental 
devolution’ is a non-workable option within the present status 
quo .… [S]itting within the 13th amendment framework there is 
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tenuous nature of the powers it delegates and the centre’s 
systematic undermining of provincial councils, there are 
still possibilities that could be explored. There are politi-
cal risks, but should the TNA find in the president a genu-
ine interlocutor willing to make positive changes within 
the limits of the existing constitution, they would be worth 
taking. Any positive changes would require the president 
to be willing to share some degree of power. There is no 
evidence of this at the moment, but should that change, 
the following could be done quickly, by executive decision 
or at most a simple majority vote in parliament. None 
would require constitutional changes, much less rejection 
of the unitary state. The president, at times in conjunction 
with parliament, could: 
 hold free and fair elections to the northern provincial 
council; 
 appoint new governors to the north and east who have 
the confidence of their respective councils. They should 
not be retired military and should preferably be Tamil 
or Muslim, without political ties to the government or 
any party; 
 amend the Provincial Councils Act to reduce the gov-
ernor’s power over council procedures, provincial fi-
nance and the provincial public service;139 
 provide adequate financial resources to northern and 
eastern councils and allow them to raise additional 
revenues; 
 consult meaningfully with the councils when planning 
and implementing development projects in the north 
and east;  
 refrain from blocking councils’ efforts to claim their 
constitutional powers over state land and police, with 
proper oversight from a politically independent body;140 
 decide as a general policy not to exercise executive 
power in relation to any subject on the devolved and 
concurrent lists and to make decisions with respect to 
“national policy” only on the basis of overall frame-
 
no way that you can push for incrementalism – there is no such 
space within the 13th amendment. Nor can the 13th amendment 
be an interim solution. Given that the 13th amendment has noth-
ing in it which will help resolve the day to day problems of the 
Tamil people this will be a fruitless exercise”. “A public memo”, 
op. cit. 
139 For more details on how the governor’s powers could be 
usefully limited, see Welikala, “Devolution within the Unitary 
State”, pp. 72-73. 
140 Establishing a truly independent supervisory authority over 
provincial police services would be best done through the re-
establishment of the national police commission, which func-
tioned briefly under the seventeenth amendment but was in effect 
dismantled by the eighteenth amendment in September 2010. 
work legislation that requires extensive consultation 
with, and grants statute-making powers to, provincial 
councils;141  
 amend the Provincial Councils Act (consequential pro-
visions) to permit provincial authorities to exercise 
executive powers over subjects on the concurrent list 
without having to pass statutes;142  
 return to provinces their right to control agrarian ser-
vices and other powers previously taken by the centre 
without constitutional authority;143 
 pass legislation placing divisional secretaries and 
grama niladharis [village headmen] – currently the 
local arms of the central government – under the con-
trol of provincial councils;144 and 
 establish inter-governmental bodies to coordinate, trouble-
shoot and build trust between centre and province.145 
These changes, and possibly others, would constitute a 
process of “building on” the thirteenth amendment: a 
dedicated effort to maximise the current constitutional 
powers of the councils in order to give Tamils and Mus-
lims a meaningful political stake in the north and east 
and to build trust between all three major communities – 
but with the expectation it would be a step toward going 
beyond the unitary constitution. Used wisely and effec-
tively by a TNA-majority council in the north, and perhaps 
eventually in a coalition with Muslim parties in the east, 
such powers could ultimately help build the trust and po-
litical support among Sinhalese needed for a government 
in Colombo to enhance constitutional powers for provincial 
councils. Increased Sinhalese support for devolution 
would be more likely if the reforms sketched out above 
were applied to all councils, including those in Sinhala-
majority areas. 
Such a scenario is unlikely in the near future, given the 
hostility of the current government to sharing power with 
any other institutions. Nonetheless, should it decide to take 
even the first few of the proposed reforms – new gover-
nors, greater resources and meaningful cooperation on 
development policy – this might help begin to overcome 
the deep distrust between the Rajapaksas and the TNA and 
 
141 13th Amendment: Essays on Practice, op. cit., p. 70. 
142 Ibid. It might ultimately be preferable, as many past pro-
posals for constitutional reform have recommended, to elimi-
nate the category of concurrent powers, thus making clearer 
which powers belong to which level of government and reduc-
ing the ability of the centre to interfere with or take back pro-
vincial powers. Abolishing the concurrent list would require 
constitutional amendment. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Welikala, “Devolution within the Unitary State”, op. cit., p. 74. 
145 Ibid, p. 75. 
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set the stage for gradual implementation of the rest of the 
reform package.  
A different, more likely, way of building on the amend-
ment and one that some in the TNA are contemplating 
would see the party contesting elections to the northern 
council and then trying to make the most of its powers, 
though with the expectation the government would not 
cooperate. The failed attempt to make something of the 
provincial councils would then be strong evidence for the 
international community that real and sustainable devolu-
tion of power, significantly beyond the thirteenth amend-
ment, is needed.146  
Tamil nationalist critics of the TNA, however, feel each 
scenario carries serious dangers and should be avoided. 
“The thirteenth amendment is just too muddy and contra-
dictory to be reformed”, argued a Tamil lawyer. “You 
need to start from scratch. It certainly can’t be built upon 
to create federalism. The state’s unitary status and the 
need for a referendum to change such entrenched clauses 
will prevent this”. “If you use the thirteenth amendment 
as a starting point”, Gajen Ponnambalam of the TNPF as-
serts, “it won’t go any further”. In fact, many Tamil activ-
ists worry that the TNA would find itself trapped in the 
provincial councils, unable ever to get someplace better. 
“The Rajapaksas will tie the TNA in legal and political 
knots by saying they can’t give more powers because of 
judicial or political opposition”, explained the lawyer.147 
There is also fear TNA politicians would turn out to be 
like other Sri Lankan politicians and be satisfied with 
only a little power. Once in provincial councils, they 
would not push for more. “Already TNA politicians are 
jockeying to become the chief minister of the northern 
province – or to see that their family members get it”, 
said the lawyer. “Both the government and the interna-
tional community are pushing them into ‘normal poli-
tics’”. Ponnambalam added, “by going into the provincial 
councils, the TNA will be legitimising them and the uni-
tary state”, even as control over the councils will offer lit-
tle tangible benefit for Tamils in the north or the east.148 
The fear is the government and international community 
would seize on TNA involvement as evidence of real 
power sharing and that the long-sought political solution 
had been found. There is also an important question of 
symbolism. As long as the unitary state denies Tamils in-
dependent power to manage their lives, working within the 
state system would send a powerful message of continued 
 
146 Crisis Group telephone interviews, TNA advisers, August 
and September 2012. 
147 Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Colombo, June 2012; tele-
phone interview, Ponnambalam, September 2012. 
148 Ibid. 
dependence on a government and state controlled by and 
working for the interests of the majority ethnic group. 
All these risks are real, but the TNA has limited options. 
There is little chance in the short term of generating the 
fundamental shift in international and domestic political 
dynamics that would lend support to a more confronta-
tional campaign for self-determination rights. For the fore-
seeable future, its key international supporters, India and 
the U.S., will continue urging it to be pragmatic and make 
the most of what the current system offers, even as it pushes 
for major constitutional changes.  
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V. OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO 
MEANINGFUL DEVOLUTION 
The main obstacle to progress toward a lasting political 
solution to Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflicts is the lack of po-
litical will in the president’s office and the defence minis-
try his brother heads. Nonetheless, were this to change – 
whether due to the Rajapaksas’ recalculation of interests, 
increased international pressure or elections that brought 
a new administration to power – serious political work 
would still be needed. To reach the point where it is pos-
sible to fully implement the thirteenth amendment, includ-
ing allowing provincial police and land powers and the 
re-merger of the north and east, would require addressing 
the concerns and fears of significant numbers of Sinhalese 
and Muslims. To move beyond the thirteenth amendment 
to a federal system would be an even bigger political change, 
requiring a concerted effort from both the top and below.  
A. ADDRESSING SINHALESE RESISTANCE 
One reason some supporters give for the Rajapaksas’ re-
fusal to implement the thirteenth amendment and negoti-
ate seriously with the TNA is fear of a backlash from their 
Sinhala constituency. This threat is exaggerated, given the 
strong hold the Rajapaksas have on parliament and the 
military. A local political analyst explained: 
Yes, there is a hard core of Sinhala Buddhist ideology 
driving part of the Sinhala polity, but the current re-
vival of majoritarianism is significantly fuelled by the 
Rajapaksas’ project of cultivating a long-term con-
stituency for the president and his heirs. Rather than 
driving through a solution using his political capital, 
[the president] has actively gone about winning the 
hardliners over and expanding his base. He’s being 
disingenuous in using the hardliners as an excuse for 
not pushing through the needed solutions.149 
Nonetheless, the president would clearly lose some, though 
likely a manageable amount of Sinhalese support if he 
implemented the thirteenth amendment in the expansive 
way outlined above, and more if he agreed to go beyond 
it.150 While there was significant Sinhalese support for 
devolution proposals under President Kumaratunga and 
 
149 Crisis Group email correspondence, October 2012. Diplo-
mats and political analysts reported increasing unhappiness at 
senior levels of the government and the ruling SLFP over the 
Rajapaksas’ resistance to devolution and to a deal with the 
TNA. Crisis Group interviews, Colombo, June 2012, telephone 
interview, September and October 2012. 
150 The loss could almost certainly be offset by increased Tamil 
and Muslim votes, though this would require the Rajapaksas to 
begin governing in new, more consensual ways. 
during the peace process, in the last five years, “there has 
been a lot of anti-devolution discourse. This has set things 
back years”.151 
Many Sinhalese have long believed that the thirteenth 
amendment goes too far: at best creating an unnecessary 
and wasteful layer of bureaucracy and political positions, 
at worst, paving the way for a separate Tamil state. In the 
words of a Sinhala journalist, “it’s too expensive and un-
necessary for all provinces to have provincial councils. 
But you can’t just give it only to the north and east. That 
would be the stepping stone to a separate state”.152 While 
so-called asymmetrical devolution to the north and east 
makes the most sense as a response to Tamil demands for 
autonomy, it also is the most politically threatening for 
Sinhalese. 
Many thirteenth amendment opponents argue that India 
imposed the provincial council system undemocratically 
and continues to push implementation for its own politi-
cal reasons, namely to have a client state in the north run 
by Tamil parties it can control.153 Some Sinhala critics of 
devolution call for a referendum on the thirteenth amend-
ment. Others demand its repeal.154 All critics agree that no 
 
151 Crisis Group interview, Muslim politician, Colombo, June 
2012. Nonetheless, polls conducted in 2009 and 2010 showed 
considerable Sinhala support for increased devolution of power 
to the provinces under a unitary state, along the lines suggested 
by the unofficial final report of the APRC. See Colin Irwin, 
“‘War and Peace’ and the APRC Proposals”, May 2010 and 
Colin Irwin, “The APRC Proposals and ‘Winning the Peace’”, 
June 2009, available at www.peacepolls.org. 
152 Crisis Group interview, Colombo, June 2012. Responding to 
Sampanthan’s statement that ITAK’s compromises do not mean 
“we have abandoned our fundamental objectives”, a Sinhalese 
diaspora organisation wrote: “This is a form of deception simi-
lar to the ‘Little Now, More Later’ policy for separatism of 
S.J.V. Chelvanayagam which makes any nation-building dis-
cussions with the ITAK and similar race-based political parties 
such as the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) a totally unproduc-
tive exercise”. “Sri Lanka, One Country for All”, op. cit. 
153 “The Government is hamstrung by India’s persistence for 
the full implementation of 13A, and the call for elections to the 
Northern Provincial Council. We have said this before, and say 
it again, the reason for this demand is patently clear. India would 
like an unofficial eighth union territory under the control of its 
proxy, the TNA”. “Hold referendum on PCs and 13A”, The 
Sunday Times, 5 August 2012. “The implementation of the 13th 
Amendment has been the persistent chant of the country’s en-
emies since the defeat of Prabhakaran”. Gunadasa 
Amarasekera, “The beginning of the end?”, Island, 28 Septem-
ber 2012. 
154 “Prior to revisiting 13A and the Indo-Lanka Accord, the Gov-
ernment might well consider holding a Referendum to ascertain 
the views of all Sri Lankans on 13A, the Accord and the Provin-
cial Council system”. “Hold referendum on PCs and 13A”, The 
Sunday Times, 5 August 2012. “It is time for the members of 
the UPFA to get rid of this obnoxious piece of legislation im-
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land and police powers should be given to provincial coun-
cils. In the words of a well-known Sinhala intellectual, 
the aim of India and the U.S. is “to force Mahinda Raja-
paksa to implement the 13th amendment giving police and 
land powers. It would open the flood gates for the rest to 
flow”.155  
Sinhala nationalists object particularly strongly to Tamil 
demands for the north and east to be re-merged into a 
single province. For the same reasons it is important for 
Tamil nationalists – as a way of recognising the nation 
and homeland – it is threatening to many Sinhala nation-
alists, whose longstanding position is that the devolution 
unit should be the district, not province, much less a united 
north-eastern province.156 This position is often, though 
not always, underpinned by stronger Sinhala nationalist 
ideas – recently articulated by Defence Secretary Gotabaya 
Rajapaksa and regularly argued by the JHU and National 
Freedom Front (NFF) – that deny the Tamil character of 
the north and east.157 
Neither the TNA nor any other Tamil party is likely ever 
to convince a majority of Sinhalese to support strong 
devolution. Nonetheless, there are things the TNA could 
do to weaken the hold of these beliefs among at least 
 
posed on us by India with the connivance of the Western coun-
tries .… Now that the LTTE has been defeated, there is no rea-
son why the Thirteenth Amendment should be part of the Con-
stitution. The government should have taken steps to abolish it 
soon after the LTTE terrorists were defeated three years ago”. 
Nalin de Silva, “Abolish the thirteenth amendment”, Island, 26 
September 2012. 
155 “The Sinhala people … will oppose devolution of police and 
land powers to the Provincial councils and definitely to a so-
called thirteen plus. What they could finally agree with is a thir-
teen minus, and if the West or anybody else thinks that they 
could ignore the majority opinion, then they have not learnt any 
lessons”. Nalin de Silva, “Thirteen minus not thirteen plus”, 
Island, 18 January 2012. Amarasekera, “The beginning of the 
end?”, op. cit. 
156 “[P]ublic resistance to giving more powers to the provinces 
… does not mean”, argued The Sunday Times editors, that “de-
volution as a means of administrative necessity must be ruled 
out in its entirety. If devolution of powers in the context of any 
13+ is a ‘no-no’, the District Councils as the unit of devolution 
and certain administrative powers, including limited land and 
police powers being decentralised, is a ‘can-can’. “The intrica-
cies of the Indian factor”, The Sunday Times, 22 April 2012. 
157 Charles Haviland, “Gotabhaya Rajapaksa”, op. cit. These 
positions lend credence to the belief of many Tamils that “the 
basic problem isn’t fear of separation. The problem is a desire 
to preserve the status quo and more deeply establish the highly 
centralised Sinhala Buddhist state. There’s a distinct agenda of 
Sinhala Buddhist hegemony and there’s 60 years of evidence to 
show that the Sinhalese won’t change”. Crisis Group telephone 
interview, Gajen Ponnambalam, August 2012. 
some Sinhalese. One useful step, as a Tamil academic ar-
gued, would be for the TNA to: 
… take a stronger line distancing itself from the LTTE. 
They should say it was a mistake to be so closely 
aligned to the LTTE. At the very least, ITAK could be 
saying it, and those in parties that were killed off by 
LTTE. They could gain a lot in the south by saying 
what everyone knows, which is that they were forced 
to follow their line and that it was a mistake”.158  
This would be hard, but the longer it fails to address the 
destructive legacy of the LTTE and its previous silence 
about the Tigers, the easier it is for critics to question its 
motives and credibility.159  
The TNA should also avoid asserting an abstract and le-
galistic principle of national identity and the right of self-
determination. Instead, the emphasis should be on the 
practical problems, injustices and denial of rights suffered 
by Tamils, especially but not only in the north and east, 
and how they could best be addressed through specific 
and practical changes in policies and state structures.160 In 
particular, there needs to be a clear argument, directed at 
Sinhalese, for why a specific set of devolved powers are 
required to solve these problems and how the TNA would 
use them. This is something that the LTTE was never in-
terested in doing and never allowed other Tamils to do 
safely.  
Without abandoning their assertion of Tamil identity and 
nationhood, the TNA needs to devise creative and practi-
cal ways to affirm and protect the Tamil character of the 
north and east without triggering the fear of separatism.161 
 
158 Crisis Group telephone interview, October 2012. 
159 For example: “The TNA/ITAK not only endorsed the Liber-
ation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as the ‘sole representa-
tives of the Tamil People’ but directly benefitted from the vio-
lence perpetrated by the LTTE on Tamil political opponents. In 
particular, the Sri Lankan General Elections of 2004 saw un-
precedented vote rigging by the LTTE in favour of TNA/ITAK 
candidates …. The ITAK never condemned the LTTE for its 
terrorism, ethnic cleansing, Tamil child conscription, extortion 
from Tamils people and the holding Tamil civilians as ‘Human 
Shields’…”. “Sri Lanka, One Country for All”, op. cit. 
160 The TNA’s recent revival of self-determination language 
has offered no detailed explanation of why or how the Tamil 
nation requires the full autonomy being demanded nor how it 
would work. Instead, it has combined a retelling of the history 
of Tamils’ political disempowerment and denial of rights with 
an assertion of an inherent right to wide powers given the Tam-
ils’ status as a nation equal to the Sinhalese. The use of the dis-
tinction between internal and external self-determination has, 
for many of its audience, further tainted the positive aspects of 
the more modest version with the threat of separation. 
161 Should Sinhalese leaders ever be interested, there are many 
practical options for responding to Sinhalese fears: independent 
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This should be part of a thorough re-thinking of the grounds 
of Tamil nationalist claims, taking fully into account the 
distinctiveness of Muslim self-identity and the fact that a 
large portion of Sri Lankan Tamils – and certainly more 
than half of the Tamil-speaking community as a whole – 
lives outside the north and east.  
B. ENGAGING MUSLIMS POLITICALLY 
1. Addressing Muslim concerns and crafting  
a new relationship 
Muslims and Tamils, particularly in the north and east, 
share many concerns and threats, ranging from the rou-
tine denial of their language rights as Tamil speakers, to 
land grabs by the politically connected and attacks on re-
ligious sites and identity.162 Both communities feel in-
creasingly insecure in the face of the aggressive assertion 
of Sinhala and Buddhist identity. Even the powerful Mus-
lim politicians in government have proven unable to offer 
adequate protection. Nonetheless, many Muslims, espe-
cially in the east, have major worries about the further 
devolution of power, particularly on the basis of a merged 
north-eastern province. Widespread fears of being a mi-
nority trapped in a Tamil-dominated region have spawned 
proposals for a separate Muslim administrative district in 
the north and east.163 Such fears are due in part to the bru-
tal experience of the LTTE’s 1990 expulsion of Muslims 
from the north as well as its massacres of Muslims in the 
east.164 These wounds are still raw, and Tamil organisations 
have done little to address them.  
Some TNA and other Tamil politicians are aware of the 
need to strengthen Tamil-Muslim relations. The TNA re-
portedly made overtures to the Sri Lanka Muslim Con-
gress (SLMC) to contest the eastern provincial council 
elections as a coalition.165 Sampanthan’s ITAK conven-
tion speech stated: “Any solution to the ethnic problem 
concerning the sovereignty of the Tamil people must also 
be acceptable to the Muslim community in Sri Lanka. 
The structure of government in Sri Lanka must also allow 
 
national and provincial police commissions to monitor the use 
of police powers; a dedicated body to monitor and ensure the 
protection of the rights of the Sinhala minority in the north and 
east; strong powers to the centre to prevent separation; even the 
right of voters in provinces to disestablish their own councils 
and return to fully central administrative control, if they choose.  
162 See Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province, op. cit. 
163 For a discussion of these proposals, see Crisis Group Report, 
Sri Lanka’s Muslims: Caught in the Crossfire, op. cit. 
164 For a discussion of the continuing impact of LTTE violence, 
see Crisis Group Reports, Sri Lanka’s Muslims, and Sri Lanka’s 
Eastern Province, both op. cit. 
165 Crisis Group interview, political analysts, Colombo, June 
2012 and telephone interviews August 2012. 
the Muslim community to fulfil their social, economic and 
political aspirations”.166  
Nonetheless, TNA and other Tamil efforts to build a com-
mon political front with Muslims face serious challenges. 
Since at least the 1980s, Muslims have resisted Tamil 
leaders’ efforts to include them within the larger “Tamil-
speaking people” they claim leadership over, arguing that 
this framework ignores Muslims’ specific identity and in-
terests.167 Muslim political alienation has been deepened 
by the violence and mistrust during the decades of Tamil 
militancy and the lack of serious and sustained efforts to 
repair relations since then.168  
Both legacies need to be addressed. Tamil leaders still 
have a worrying tendency to speak of Muslims as part of 
the “Tamil-speaking people” without any consideration of 
how the constituent elements of that people – sometimes 
referred to as “peoples” – fit and can work together.169 
 
166 ITAK speech, op. cit., p. 5. In an earlier statement, 
Sampanthan said, “it would be our Endeavour to ensure that 
any solution would also be as acceptable to our Muslim breth-
ren as it would be to the Tamil people. We reiterate without 
prejudice to the legitimate rights of our Sinhalese brethren that 
as Tamil-speaking people who have historically inhabited the 
North and East, we have common concerns in regard to our 
identity, our Security, resources in these areas, and our eco-
nomic, social and cultural well- being”. “Statement on elections 
scheduled to be held on 8th October to the Municipal Council 
Kalmunai”, 5 October 2011. Other Tamil organisations also say 
they are interested in working collectively with Muslims. TNPF 
leader Gajen Ponnambalam explained: “We would like to nego-
tiate with Muslims to establish a single Tamil-speaking territo-
rial unit, in which Muslims are satisfied through some kind of 
federal arrangement. If this were achieved, then together we 
would negotiate with the Sinhalese. If this doesn’t work, then 
we’d work out something through a three-way negotiations”, 
Crisis Group interview, August 2012.  
167 There is a long tradition of Muslim leaders preferring to 
align with the government, first as part of national, majority-
Sinhala parties, later in the form of the Sri Lanka Muslim Con-
gress and since the early 2000s, by means of a series of splinter 
parties created in large part by offers of ministries and state pat-
ronage for abandoning the SLMC.  
168 See Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province, op. 
cit., pp. 6-7; also, more generally on Tamil-Muslim relations, 
Dennis B. McGilvray and Mirak Raheem, “Muslim Perspectives 
on the Sri Lankan Conflict”, East-West Center Policy Studies 
no. 41, Washington DC, 2007. 
169 See, for instance, this passage from Sampanthan’s ITAK speech, 
where “Tamils”, “the Tamil people” and “Tamil-speaking peo-
ples” are used apparently interchangeably: “The Tamil National 
Alliance provides strong leadership to all Tamils. When con-
sidering issues of development and deterioration of the Tamil 
people there can be no division of the Muslim, Hindu or Chris-
tian communities … bringing together Tamil speaking peoples 
of the Hindu, Muslim and Christian communities to join in our 
journey to freedom must be a priority”. 
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Muslims are unlikely to sign on to a joint political project 
without first being confident they will be treated as equals 
and their distinct identity will be respected once they have 
“join[ed] under the umbrella of Tamil-speaking peoples”.170 
They need to be given a central role in devising a strategy 
for a workable and just devolution of power. Developing 
this kind of shared strategising will take time. It will also 
require prominent Muslims to take the political risks of 
engaging seriously with Tamil leaders. 
Muslims are also unlikely to work with the TNA in seri-
ous numbers until there has been a real acceptance of and 
reckoning with the LTTE’s crimes against them. There is 
a bitter history of violence and betrayal to work through, 
with many Tamils feeling they, too, have been wronged, 
by the many Muslims who sided with the government. 
Many Muslims are still waiting for Tamil political leaders 
to apologise for – or otherwise publicly recognise – the 
pain caused by the LTTE’s expulsion of northern Mus-
lims and violence in the east.171 
Much work must be done at the local level, where Mus-
lims and Tamils in the north and east all too often find 
themselves fighting over scarce land and livelihood op-
portunities, rather than working together to rebuild their 
lives and claim their rights.172 Some Muslim activists com-
plain that the TNA’s public campaign to call attention to 
the litany of problems northern and eastern Tamils face 
mostly ignores the similar problems faced by thousands 
of Muslims, many returning home after two decades of 
displacement.173 
Both communities will need to develop new strategies to 
avoid zero-sum battles over resources and prevent the 
government from using its divide-and-rule strategy, which 
relies on control over government-aligned Muslim and 
 
170 Ibid. 
171 Crisis Group interviews, Muslim activists, June and October 
2012. In a public statement, a group of Tamil academics and 
members of civil society organisations condemned the expul-
sion and called for a broader accounting within the Tamil com-
munity for injustices committed against Muslims. See “An ap-
peal to the Tamil Community and its civil and political repre-
sentatives”, Island, 6 January 2012. This was followed by a 
similar appeal by members of Muslim civic groups urging “pol-
iticians and civil society groups of all ethnicities to acknowledge 
the suffering of their ethnic others and to develop processes of 
engagement towards reconciliation”. Statement on Reconcilia-
tion by Muslim Civil Society Individuals, transcurrents.com, 17 
February 2012. 
172 For a detailed analysis of how struggles for land and other 
resources in the north and east can easily lead to Tamil-Muslim 
tensions, see Crisis Group Reports, Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province, 
op. cit., pp. 17-19 and Sri Lanka’s North I, op. cit., pp. 27-31. 
173 Crisis Group interviews, Muslim activists, June and October 
2012.  
Tamil politicians in the north and east. Just as Tamil lead-
ers need to begin advocating more clearly and strongly for 
the rights and interests of Muslims, so too Muslim com-
munity leaders need to challenge their own politicians, 
who, while serving in key government positions, have pri-
oritised personal political survival over addressing the 
needs of their community. 
2. Political realities: the case of the 2012 Eastern 
Provincial Council elections 
The serious challenges facing any attempt to form an alli-
ance of Tamil-speaking parties – centred on the TNA and 
SLMC – can be seen from the results and aftermath of the 
8 September 2012 eastern provincial council elections.174  
As always in Sri Lankan provincial elections, the gov-
ernment coalition was at a distinct advantage, with voters 
knowing that a council controlled by the opposition would 
have much less access to resources than one aligned with 
the ruling party in Colombo.175 Not surprisingly, the rul-
ing UPFA coalition, with 32 per cent of the vote, received 
the most seats, fourteen, on the 37-member council. The 
TNA was close behind, with 31 per cent, but only eleven 
seats, as the party with the highest percentage is granted 
two bonus seats. The SLMC, a constituent member of the 
central government but standing on its own in the east, 
won 21 per cent and seven seats. The UNP won 12 per cent 
and four seats; the National Freedom Front (NFF), a small 
Sinhala nationalist party in the ruling coalition in Co-
lombo, won one seat. 
 
174 According to government figures released in April 2012, the 
eastern province has a population of 1,551,381. Ampara is the 
largest district, with 648,057, while Batticaloa district has 
525,142 and Trincomalee 378,182. Sri Lankas Tamils account-
ed for 39.6 per cent of the provincial population, Sri Lankan 
Moors (Muslims) were 36.7 per cent and Sinhalese 23.1 per 
cent. In the 2012 district-level ethnic breakdown, Ampara was 
43.6 per cent Muslim, 38.7 per cent Sinhalese and 17.4 per cent 
Sri Lankan Tamil; Batticaloa was 72.6 per cent Sri Lankan 
Tamil, 25.5 per cent Muslim and 1.2 per cent Sinhalese; and 
Trincomalee was 40.4 per cent Muslim, 30.6 per cent Tamil, 
and 27 per cent Sinhalese. “Population by ethnic group accord-
ing to districts, 2012”, Sri Lanka Department of Census and 
Statistics, www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/CPH2011/index. 
php?fileName=Activities/Tentativelistof Publications. For na-
tional-level ethnic population figures, see note 2 above. 
175 The campaign was also marked by serious violations of 
election law, including the large-scale misuse of state resources 
and offers of state patronage by government ministers and gov-
ernment candidates, but also serious incidents of violence and 
intimidation against candidates and supporters of the TNA, 
SLMC and UNP. For the views of election monitors, see 
Camelia Nathaniel, “Neither free nor fair”, Ceylon Today, 11 
September 2012. 
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The results clearly established the TNA as the choice of 
the Tamil people in the east. The only other Tamil candi-
date to be elected was the former chief minister, S. 
Chandrakanthan (alias Pillaiyan); otherwise, all mem-
bers of his pro-government TMVP party were defeated.176 
Nonetheless, TNA leaders were disappointed that they 
did not win one or two additional seats.177 Many had re-
ported unusually high levels of enthusiasm among voters 
during the campaign, with some calling it a “celebration” 
that reminded them of the excitement generated by the 
TULF in the 1977 general election.178 Hopes among TNA 
members and supporters were high in the final weeks be-
fore the vote. Hundreds of volunteers from Colombo, 
Jaffna and Vanni reportedly campaigned for the TNA in 
the east.179 Yet voter turnout in Tamil-majority areas was 
not as high as some had hoped, perhaps in part because of 
government intimidation, or fear of violence on election 
day.180  
With no party receiving a majority, jockeying to form a 
post-election alliance with at least nineteen seats was in-
tense. The TNA had wooed the SLMC throughout the cam-
paign and long hoped that a joint council could be formed. 
Immediately after the results were announced, Sampan-
than invited the UNP and SLMC to join the TNA to form 
a working majority and offered the chief minister post to 
the SLMC. The UNP accepted, but the SLMC hesitated, 
its leadership split.  
The election campaign revealed serious and growing un-
happiness among many Muslim voters with the govern-
ment, with much of the criticism focusing on the lack of 
action to prevent or punish those responsible for the April 
2012 attack on the Muslim mosque in the central town of 
Dambulla, led by Buddhist monks and tacitly condoned 
 
176 The TNA, then still beholden to the LTTE, chose not to con-
test the 2008 elections, so the TMVP was the only significant 
Tamil party to participate. It won 6 seats, and its party head, 
Pillaiyan, was named chief minister after a major internal UPFA 
struggle with Muslim UPFA parties, which demanded a Mus-
lim be made chief minister. 
177 Crisis Group telephone interviews, lawyers and activists 
close to the TNA, September 2012.  
178 Crisis Group telephone interview, Tamil activist, September 
2012. 
179 Crisis Group interviews, TNA and Tamil activists, August 
and September 2012. 
180 The TNA stronghold, but heavily militarised, polling district 
of Padiruppu, in Batticaloa, had a turnout of only 58.5 per cent. 
Otherwise, totals across the province ranged from 61 to 67.5 
per cent, and averaged out to 65.6 per cent. According to one 
analysis, more than 120,000 Tamils in Batticaloa alone did not 
vote; the real total is likely to have been 90,000-100,000. See 
D.B.S. Jeyaraj, “TNA trying to form eastern administration with 
UNP support under Muslim chief minister”, dbsjeyaraj.com, 9 
September 2012.  
by the prime minister and other senior ministers.181 Many 
SLMC candidates were actively critical of the government.  
Despite having Muslim ministers in Colombo and on the 
Eastern provincial council, many eastern Muslims feel their 
resource needs and grievances have not been adequately 
addressed and that they remain politically marginalised.182 
Nonetheless, SLMC officials are in the Rajapaksa gov-
ernment, including the party leader and justice minister, 
Rauff Hakeem. The leadership was loath to risk these po-
sitions by going into opposition in the east. The govern-
ment reportedly threatened to buy off additional SLMC 
members of parliament at the centre, having earlier helped 
create the splits that led to the formation of the All Cey-
lon Muslim Congress (ACMC) and National Congress 
(NC).183 Their leaders also hold cabinet posts in Colombo 
and have important power bases in the east.184  
While the SLMC is often referred to as electoral “king-
makers”, regularly making and breaking governments in 
Colombo, the leadership’s apparent desire to remain in 
power at all costs has put it at the mercy of the govern-
ment’s ability to use threats and promises of resources and 
positions to weaken and even break the party.185 The TNA 
was reported to be under similar pressure, with the govern-
ment said to be working hard to coax at least four newly 
elected members to cross over to the UPFA side.186 In the 
end the SLMC stayed with the government and joined the 
 
181 Kishali Pinto Jayawardena, “Stirring a dangerous cauldron 
of religious hatred”, The Sunday Times, 6 May 2012. 
182 For instance, there has never been a Muslim district secre-
tary in Ampara or Trincomalee, despite Muslims being in a clear 
plurality in each district: 44 and 45 per cent respectively. Mirak 
Raheem, “Muslims and the Eastern Provincial Council Elec-
tions in Sri Lanka: Kingmakers or Pawns?”, Groundviews.org, 
6 September 2012. 
183 Crisis Group telephone interviews, political analysts, Septem-
ber 2012. Threats by the government to persuade a number of 
other SLMC parliamentarians to cross over were reportedly cen-
tral to the Hakeem and SLMC decisions to join the government 
in 2010.  
184 The ACMC is headed by Rishad Bathiudeen, from the north-
ern town of Mannar, but is represented in the east by former 
Batticaloa-based parliamentarian Ameer Ali. The National Con-
gress is led by N.L.M. Athaulla, whose power base is the town 
of Akkaraipattu, in Ampara district. The two UFPA Muslim 
parties contributed seven of the UPFA’s twelve elected council 
members. Fifteen of the 35 provincial council members elected 
in 2012 are Muslim: seven in the SLMC, seven in the UPFA, 
one in the UNP.  
185 For a valuable analysis of these dynamics, see Mirak 
Raheem, “Muslims and the Eastern Provincial Council Elec-
tions”, op. cit. 
186 Crisis Group interview, human rights activist, September 
2012. D.B.S. Jeyaraj, “Military Intelligence Operatives ‘Pres-
sure’ TNA Eastern Councillors Into Supporting UPFA Admin-
istration”, dbsjeyaraj.com, 14 September 2012. 
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UPFA in the east.187 This could ultimately cost it dearly, 
as many of its voters are deeply angry with the govern-
ment. In the words of an activist close to the party, “when 
there is an overt expression by the people of their wish for 
the party to take a pro-active stance towards the better-
ment of minority communities, the leadership’s decision 
not to risk earning the wrath of the Rajapaksas poses a 
question as to their commitment … to serve the interest of 
the community”.188 
C. THE FORGOTTEN COMMUNITY: 
UPCOUNTRY TAMILS 
Any political project to defend rights and better institu-
tionalise Sri Lanka’s multi-ethnic character will need to 
engage with the interests and concerns of the Upcountry 
Tamils, who constitute more than a quarter of all Tamils 
in the country and a sixth of its Tamil-speaking popula-
tion.189 The TNA would be wise to reach out to the com-
munity, which has long been Sri Lanka’s poorest and most 
politically marginalised, and show that the party under-
stands and has plans for addressing Upcountry Tamils’ 
specific problems. To do so will be a challenge, espe-
cially given the tradition of the major Upcountry Tamil 
parties joining the government, as well as the history of 
class and caste-based discrimination against the commu-
nity by its cousins from the north and east.190 Nonethe-
 
187 The chief minister position was given to long-time SLFP poli-
tician Najeeb A. Majeed, rather than to a member of one of the 
three Muslim parties in the governing coalition. “Sri Lanka’s 
Eastern Province gets new chief minister”, PTI, 18 September 
2012. 
188 Crisis Group interview, Muslim activist, October 2012. 
189 The community is also known as “Plantation” or “Indian” 
Tamils, thanks to its origin in indentured labourers from south-
ern India brought by the British in the mid-1800s to work on 
the coffee and tea plantations in the central hills. 2012 figures 
from the Sri Lankan census show there are 842,000 “Indian 
Tamils”, 4.2 per cent of the population, though scholars argue 
that increasing numbers of Upcountry Tamils list themselves as 
“Sri Lankan Tamils” on the census and government forms. 
“Population by ethnic group”, op. cit. A. Lawrence, Malayaha 
Tamils: Power Sharing and Local Democracy in Sri Lanka (Co-
lombo, 2011); Daniel Bass, Everyday Ethnicity in Sri Lanka: 
Up-country Tamil Identity Politics (New York, 2012). 
190 Beginning with its founding in 1950 by S. Thondaman, the 
largest party representing Upcountry Tamils, the Ceylon Work-
ers Congress (CWC), has traditionally joined whichever govern-
ment is in power and used its leverage to win limited benefits 
for the community. Its rival, the Upcountry People’s Front (UPF), 
is also part of the government. Only from 1970 to 1975, when 
the CWC joined the Tamil United Front (TUF), has an Upcoun-
try Tamil party worked with Tamil parties from the north and 
east as part of a larger political struggle. On discrimination and 
political marginalisation faced by Upcountry Tamils and pro-
less, the shared experience of discrimination, particularly 
on the basis of language, and the self-interest of all 
Tamils in increasing their political leverage, suggests the 
importance of working more closely together.  
The TNA should learn from the mistakes of an earlier 
generation of Tamil leaders and make determined efforts 
to build alliances with those Upcountry Tamil politicians 
and activists willing and able to challenge government 
policies.191 It would do well in particular to work with and 
learn from the experiences of Colombo-based politician 
Mano Ganesan. He is nearly unique in what a Tamil ac-
tivist called his efforts to create “a pan-Tamil political 
solidarity while also asserting his Sri Lankan identity and 
participating in struggles along with the southern political 
parties and civil society groups on Sri Lankan issues. This 
multiple identity is the reality for many plantation and 
southern-based Tamils”. The TNA needs to find ways of 
recognising this, without abandoning its classic concern 
with territorial-based devolution in the north and east.192 
 
posals for assuring their equal citizenship, see Malayaha Tam-
ils, op. cit. 
191 A founding mistake of post-independence Tamil politics was 
the decision of the community’s then leading party, the Tamil 
Congress, then in coalition with the ruling UNP, to support leg-
islation that denied citizenship and voting rights to the nearly 
one million plantation Tamils of “recent Indian origin”. Many, 
though born in Sri Lanka, were ultimately “returned” to India. 
For an analysis of the politics behind the disenfranchisement of 
Upcountry Tamils, see Rajan Hoole, et al., The Broken 
Palmyrah (Claremont, CA, 1990), pp. 1-7. 
192 Ganesan is the leader of the Democratic People’s Front, a 
small party that appeals mostly to Upcountry Tamils based in 
the western province, and an active campaigner against enforced 
disappearances. Crisis Group email correspondence, Tamil ac-
tivist, October 2012. Malayaha Tamils, op. cit. 
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VI. PREVENTING THE WORST, 
BUILDING ALLIANCES, EXPANDING 
THE FOCUS 
In addition to the long-term work of rebuilding and re-
framing relationships with other ethnic communities, Tamil 
leaders and others working for sustainable peace face short-
, medium- and long-term challenges. The immediate aim, 
requiring sustained international support, should be the 
demilitarisation and democratisation of the north. This 
should be followed quickly by a negotiated deal on ex-
panded devolution within a unitary state. There are only a 
limited number of years the 79-year-old Sampanthan can 
continue as party leader, and “it will be impossible for the 
TNA to continue to pursue moderate positions without 
getting either political concessions or some concrete im-
provements for Tamils on the ground”.193 Without signifi-
cant changes in the way Tamil areas are governed, a post-
Sampanthan TNA is likely to split, or adopt more strongly 
nationalist positions.  
Constitutional changes beyond the unitary state will al-
most certainly have to wait until there is a government in 
Colombo more amenable to real negotiations and mean-
ingful power sharing. With its two-thirds parliamentary 
majority and credentials as the conquerors of the LTTE, 
the Rajapaksa government is in an ideal position to gain 
support for a constitutional deal on devolution. It seems 
to have little interest, however, in power sharing and no 
intention to make bold moves. The goals of any engage-
ment with the government in the near term thus should be 
to reverse the over-centralised and militarised governance 
of the north and east, while laying the legal and political 
groundwork for a future process of mutual trust-building 
that can lead to meaningful power sharing. 
A. IMMEDIATE PRIORITIES 
Strong messages need to be delivered consistently by all 
possible international actors that the government’s current 
policies in the north are unacceptable. Continued high troop 
levels in the Vanni, tight military control over the popula-
tion and civil administration, land grabs, Sinhalisation, 
suppression of political activism and serious human rights 
abuses are all in direct violation of the letter and spirit of 
the March 2012 Human Rights Council resolution. Gov-
ernment claims to have reduced the role of the military in 
the north should be rejected as the propaganda they are, 
and government plans for long-term demographic change 
and continued militarisation should be resisted. 
 
193 Crisis Group interview, former government official, June 2012. 
Donors, both multilateral and bilateral, have an important 
responsibility to monitor and report on the situation in the 
north and east. They should insist that at least minimal 
democratic conditions be put in place before implementing 
their projects. The governments of Japan, India, the U.S. 
and the European Union (EU), in their individual roles and 
together with other contributing states to the World Bank, 
Asian Development Bank and International Monetary Fund, 
need to work cooperatively and urgently to ensure finan-
cial and development assistance does not further contribute 
to the consolidation of an undemocratic, unjust and ulti-
mately volatile political regime in the north and east.194  
One minimal but essential democratic condition in the 
north is an elected provincial council. While the powers 
of the provincial council are extremely limited, control of 
that institution would give the TNA and northern Tamils 
a new set of tools with which to monitor, highlight and 
challenge militarisation and other inequitable policies in 
the north. The government should be told clearly that suc-
cessful northern elections need to be held by early 2013 
and that this will be an important marker of compliance 
with the Human Rights Council’s resolution.195  
B. MEDIUM-TERM STRATEGY 
Meanwhile, the TNA and influential foreign governments 
should keep pressing Colombo, as a first step, to allow 
provinces, particularly the north and east, to enjoy the 
maximum possible devolution allowed under the thir-
teenth amendment. Implementing the administrative and 
legal changes detailed above would in principle allow the 
northern and ultimately perhaps the eastern province to 
test what it is possible to accomplish without undue inter-
ference from Colombo.  
 
194 For more detailed analysis of how donors and development 
and humanitarian agencies can better ensure their work in the 
north and east respects principles of conflict sensitivity and 
democratic governance, see Crisis Group Reports, Sri Lanka’s 
North I and North II, both op. cit. 
195 Some analysts worry that in postponing the election until 
September 2013, the government may be planning to make sig-
nificant changes to the electoral list in order to weaken the TNA. 
“The government may be relying on soldiers stationed in the 
north and their families who would be able to vote. If they do 
that before May 2013, these people would be on the new elec-
toral list for any election post-June. Unfortunately, no one in the 
TNA is thinking about how to counter Sinhalese votes in the 
northern province”. Crisis Group telephone interview, lawyer, 
Colombo, September 2012. Commonwealth governments should 
also make clear to the Sri Lanka government that the successful 
functioning of the northern provincial council will be a factor in 
deciding on their attendance at the heads of government meet-
ing in Colombo in October 2013. 
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Though no constitutional changes would be needed, the 
government would likely insist that all issues concerning 
devolution and political reforms, even those within the 
existing constitution, be considered through its favoured 
vehicle, the parliamentary select committee (PSC). If so, 
the TNA and governments with influence should insist 
that a) the PSC be a time-bound process; b) it have a formal 
agenda that builds upon bilateral discussions between the 
government and the TNA, perhaps through consideration 
of a package of reform proposals from earlier governments; 
c) its outcomes be recognised as an interim solution, and 
more devolution or other forms of power sharing may be 
needed; and d) the functioning of the PSC not be allowed 
to delay elections to the northern provincial council. 
C. THE INTERNATIONAL FACTOR 
Both the TNA and Tamil organisations in the diaspora 
have made it clear they are relying on international pres-
sure on the government to increase their bargaining 
power and help win their rights. While careful and consis-
tent support for a just political settlement is crucial, there 
is a real risk of overreliance on the international commu-
nity.196 Tamils in and outside Sri Lanka need to under-
stand and work from political realities, even as they try 
to change them.197 These include no international support 
for a separate state, continued hostility to the LTTE and 
that concern with and attention to Sri Lanka will likely 
remain limited and intermittent. However important in-
ternational lobbying and international institutions are, 
sustainable progress in the country will mostly have to be 
built from difficult domestic work. 
For Tamil diaspora organisations, this should mean in-
creasing their support for the TNA and accepting, how-
ever critically, its leading role in setting the Tamil politi-
cal agenda. Diaspora activism in its current form, particu-
larly on accountability for war crimes, as often as not 
plays into the hands of the government and Sinhalese 
 
196 A diaspora activist worried that some foreign governments 
are “encouraging what are often unrealistic expectations. Either 
the Tamil politicians need a more informed, realistic sense of the 
geopolitics and individual donor interests that will necessarily 
shape any possible avenues of action, or the I[nternational] 
C[ommunity] should provide more honest feedback in the dia-
logue between the two. At the moment it almost appears as if 
[Tamils] are struggling to be the political version of a “model 
minority” with high hopes of rewards that may never come”. 
Crisis Group email correspondence, October 2012. 
197 In the words of a Western diplomat: “There’s a reality: the 
LTTE lost the war for independence. The sooner Tamils accept 
this reality, the sooner they can move on to getting what’s pos-
sible. It’s not realistic to think, at this stage after the end of the 
war, there will be a federal solution”. Crisis Group interview, 
Western diplomat, October 2012. 
hardliners and weakens the negotiating position of the 
TNA. So long as groups push accountability issues with-
out serious attention to LTTE crimes, while waving 
LTTE flags and maintaining an explicitly separatist 
agenda, their interventions will feed deeply-held Sinhala 
fears of foreign-backed separatism. This will shrink what 
little space there is within Sri Lanka for building the 
broad political support needed for a fair political settle-
ment. 
Governments concerned with sustainable peace in Sri 
Lanka also need to be careful that their desire for construc-
tive engagement does not end up facilitating Colombo’s 
intransigence and delaying tactics. A quiet, multi-pronged 
initiative currently underway by South Africa and civil 
society organisations – designed to help restart TNA-
government negotiations and support other potential ave-
nues for reconciliation – brings with it risks that need to 
be particularly carefully managed.198 While the South Af-
rican experience of constitutional negotiations and politi-
cal reconciliation potentially has much to teach post-war 
Sri Lanka, Colombo likely hopes to use the South African 
initiative to buy time and reduce the pressure and scrutiny 
set in motion by the March 2012 Human Rights Council 
resolution. The South African government and interna-
tional community should recognise that whatever chance 
of success the initiative has depends on continued strong 
international pressure for accountability and devolution of 
power. The Sri Lankan government must not be rewarded 
simply for engaging in the South African initiative, but only 
for taking tangible and public steps that prove its com-
mitment to meaningful devolution and negotiations with 
the TNA, elections to the northern provincial council and 
respect for basic freedoms throughout the island.  
D. LONGER-TERM PRIORITIES 
In addition to the longer-term processes sketched out 
above, designed to build bridges with Muslims and Up-
country Tamils and reassure at least some Sinhalese, the 
TNA and its supporters have two other important long-
term challenges. 
 
198 Deputy Foreign Minister and senior ANC leader Ebrahim 
Ebrahim, along with well-known non-governmental advisers 
Ivor Jennings and Wolf Meyer, visited Colombo in early August 
2012 and met with the president and other senior officials. A 
government delegation visited South Africa in October. The 
South African team has also had discussions with both the TNA 
and the Global Tamil Forum. Chamikara Weerasinghe, “Govt 
will not accept mediators on internal matters”, Daily News, 20 
August 2012; Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Colombo, June 
2012; telephone interviews, diplomats and activists, October, and 
November 2012. For a positive assessment of a South African 
role, see Jayadeva Uyangoda, “South Africa can Play a Useful 
Role of Engagement with the Government and TNA”, op. cit. 
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1. Strengthening the TNA 
In order to address the deeper obstacles to successful 
devolution and state reform, the TNA will need to 
strengthen its organisation considerably by dealing with a 
number of important structural weaknesses. Supporters 
and activists agree that “they have major issues with lack 
of capacity and resources – a few at the top are clearly 
overburdened. Everyone wants to talk to them, both in-
ternational contacts and people in the provinces. You 
can’t expect Sam[panthan] to travel too extensively. I 
think they realise the capacity issue – but I’m not sure 
they are really working on it seriously”.199 One supporter 
argued that “the TNA seems to be reacting more than set-
ting the agenda .… It’s hard for them to find the time to 
step back and think about the big issues. There’s a major 
vacuum. Even the small number of members who are able 
to deal with these issues don’t have the time. They’re just 
running from one fire to another”.200 
The TNA leadership is often criticised for being domi-
nated by Colombo lawyers and lacking a serious grass-
roots organisation.201 This has begun to be addressed to 
some extent by the election in 2011 of more than 250 new 
local councillors in the north, but there is a long way to 
go. A supporter said he has urged leaders to “reactivate 
the party in the universities and wider community, to let 
people know what they are doing and to get their sup-
port”. Others worry about Sampanthan’s increasing at-
tempts to assert ITAK dominance within the alliance. 
“Sampanthan and his people need to be careful not to 
alienate other TNA parties too much”, warned a sympa-
thetic Muslim politician. A Tamil activist argued that 
election results in the east, in which most of the TNA 
candidates elected were from parties other than ITAK, 
showed Tamil voters “want to see TNA unity, not separate 
parties” and do not favour ITAK domination.202  
Finally, to be seen as a credible interlocutor by most Sin-
halese voters, and many Muslims, the TNA will have to 
address its past and, ultimately, move away more clearly 
 
199 Crisis Group telephone interviews, lawyer, Colombo, Octo-
ber 2012. 
200 Crisis Group telephone interviews, human rights activist, 
September 2012. 
201 Crisis Group interviews, lawyers, activists, political ana-
lysts, Colombo, June 2012. The party leadership is also entirely 
male. Among other drawbacks, this limits its ability to respond 
effectively to the many urgent challenges faced by Tamil wom-
en, especially in the north and east. See Crisis Group Report, 
Sri Lanka: Women’s Insecurity in the North and East, op. cit. 
202 Crisis Group telephone interviews, September and October 
2012. 
from the LTTE legacy.203 Doing so will be hard, especially 
given how deeply rooted the LTTE has been in the Tamil 
community within and outside of Sri Lanka. It is made even 
harder by the government’s refusal to consider its own or 
the Sinhala community’s share of responsibility for Tamil 
suffering. Nonetheless, it is important for the party to begin 
working through the legacy and the wounds it has left, 
both within the Tamil community, where many, including 
TNA members, were victims of LTTE violence, as well 
as in discussions between Tamil, Muslim and Sinhala com-
munity leaders.204  
2. Redefining the national question, engaging  
with a southern reform agenda 
To be successful, the Tamil struggle for rights and justice 
cannot depend primarily on international support. Tamil 
politicians and civil society will have to engage more di-
rectly in political debates beyond devolution and the north 
and east and build alliances with southern civil society 
organisations and parties interested in promoting democ-
ratic reforms. Without abandoning specifically Tamil con-
cerns, the TNA and Tamil activists need to acknowledge 
and communicate more clearly to other ethnic communi-
ties, including Sinhalese, their shared vulnerability to state 
abuse, shared interest in democratisation and shared need 
for state reform. Even as the TNA and Tamil activists ar-
ticulate clearly and forcefully to other communities the 
extent of the rights they have been denied and what 
changes are needed for them to be equal citizens, they 
also need to make clear their commitment to a common 
struggle to renew and enhance democratic rights for all. 
In practical terms, this means the TNA should actively 
support growing demands for constitutional and state re-
form across Sri Lanka. The aim should be to redefine the 
“national question”, so issues of regional power sharing 
and ethnic justice are linked directly to other legal and 
constitutional issues of direct concern to all communities, 
including the Sinhala majority.205 In addition to express-
ing solidarity with struggles for the depoliticisation and 
demilitarisation of universities and for trade union efforts,206 
 
203 M.A. Sumanthiran was reportedly jeered by a crowd in Jaffna 
when he mentioned the importance of publicly addressing LTTE 
atrocities. Crisis Group interviews, TNA advisers, August 2011. 
204 The TNA might consider establishing transitional justice 
working groups with political/civil society leaders from each 
community, tasked to work through specific issues affecting each 
relationship: Tamil-Tamil, Tamil-Sinhala, and Tamil-Muslim. 
205 For an interesting argument along similar lines, though one 
that downplays the specificity of Tamil grievances, see Kishali 
Pinto Jayawardene, “Strengthening a common struggle across 
ethnicities”, The Sunday Times, 26 August 2012.  
206 An article by the TNA’s M.A. Sumanthiran analysed and 
expressed support for the ongoing strike by university teachers 
and drew connections between militarisation of universities and 
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the TNA should be pressing for two key constitutional 
changes, for reasons of both pragmatism and principle: 
first, repeal of the eighteenth amendment, to allow return 
of independent commissions for police, judiciary, human 
rights and other issues; second, an end to the executive 
presidency and return to full parliamentary democracy.207  
Devolution of power under the thirteenth amendment or 
any replacement that may follow will always be tenuous 
at best, so long as there is an executive presidency with 
nearly unlimited powers and no institutions that can hold it 
accountable. Presidential impunity has grown even 
deeper since the passage of the eighteenth amendment, 
which further reduced the already limited independence 
of the judiciary.208 A senior constitutional lawyer argued: 
The executive presidency is so strong now, stronger 
than ever …. Can devolution work under these condi-
tions? Especially with someone like Mahinda [Raja-
paksa] who talks one thing one day and another the 
next? I don’t think there can be any positive change 
under the executive presidency. Abolishing it needs to 
be the goal of a united opposition – TNA, JVP, left 
parties and UNP under one banner.209 
Joining a cross-party alliance for fundamental constitu-
tional change would also allow Tamil leaders to make 
clearer the connections between their specific demands 
for state reform and the wider struggle for democratisation 
and demilitarisation. Perhaps most importantly, a common 
struggle on democratic principles would offer a unique 
chance to begin to overcome Tamil-Sinhala mistrust: 
 
militarisation in the north. M.A.Sumanthiran, “Solution to edu-
cation crisis lies in encouraging democratic discourse, dialogu-
ing with FUTA and realigning the budget to reflect constituent 
values”, dbsjeyaraj.com, 30 September 2012. 
207 While some TNA leaders have made public their support for 
both measures and were some of the strongest critics of the 
eighteenth amendment, there has been no effort to make these 
issues central to their campaigns or to argue for the necessity of 
such changes for achieving devolution. As others have argued, 
the TNA’s formal responses to the LLRC report failed to en-
gage seriously with the host of positive governance reforms it 
contained. See Asanga Welikala, “Some constitutional aspects 
of Sri Lanka’s post-war reconciliation debate: The LLRC report 
and the TNA response”, Oxford Transitional Justice Research 
Working Paper Series, February 2012. 
208 According to a constitutional lawyer, “with the judiciary, the 
situation is quite bad. People are losing faith. One reason is the 
eighteenth amendment. Mahinda [Rajapakaa] has a two-thirds 
majority [in parliament] and his manner of working can be quite 
crude and aggressive. Judges know to be on their best behav-
iour. He has a kind of intimidating omnipresence throughout 
the country. People are scared. On any case with political im-
port, lawyers are now telling their clients to proceed only if the 
case is very strong”. Crisis Group interview, Colombo, June 2012. 
209 Ibid. 
through working and sacrificing together for a shared po-
litical goal. Sri Lanka has seen no serious cross-ethnic po-
litical movement since the brief anti-colonial struggle of 
the 1940s. There is no guarantee that this strategy, or 
other attempts to reach out beyond the Tamil community, 
would succeed. Still, it is hard see how the TNA’s struggle 
for Tamil rights can succeed if the party does not expand 
its agenda and deepen alliances across regions and eth-
nicities. 
Effective and lasting power sharing will almost certainly 
require removing the unitary definition of the state. But it 
is clear this will need to be approached in stages. It would 
only be possible with significantly more Sinhalese sup-
port than exists now – enough to make more Sinhala poli-
ticians feel they would not suffer too much electorally for 
supporting it. For this to happen, new political alliances 
need to be imagined and created by all actors: the TNA, 
other Tamil parties, Muslim and Upcountry Tamil parties, 
pro-devolution Sinhalese and internationals concerned with 
Sri Lanka’s democracy and long-term stability. This is 
their most important collective long-term task. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Resolving Sri Lanka’s “national question” will require 
ensuring that the interests, identities and rights of Tamils 
and other Tamil-speaking peoples are fairly represented 
within, and respected by, the state. Making progress to-
wards this goal demands both immediate action and patient, 
long-term work across different communities.  
The most urgent task is to reverse the government’s current 
campaign to destroy the political, economic and demo-
graphic basis for an autonomous Tamil-speaking region in 
the north and east. The government must be pressed to 
reverse the Sinhalisation and militarisation of the north 
and east and other policies that undermine the ability of 
Tamils to manage their own affairs in the areas they have 
traditionally lived in and been the majority within.  
At the same time, work must begin for deeper changes in 
ethnic relations and in how the country’s many overlap-
ping conflicts are framed and understood. Such efforts will 
likely have to proceed against the continued resistance of 
the government and will require the TNA and other Tamil 
parties to negotiate and build alliances with other com-
munities. It will also require addressing the needs and de-
fending the rights of the many Tamils who live outside the 
north and east. 
Ultimately, for a lasting peace to be assured, the Sri Lankan 
state will need to confront the issues of identity and recog-
nition that have always helped drive the modern Tamil 
political struggle. It will need to devise ways of recognis-
ing Tamils as a people equal in status to Sinhalese, with 
the right to rule their own affairs and enjoy the respect 
and protection that only comes with having a territory in 
which the community is a majority. To this end, creative 
ways will likely need to be found to make possible an ef-
fective re-merger of at least parts of the east with the north, 
without endangering the interests or rights of Muslims or 
Sinhalese. So long as the government continues to refuse 
to devolve power to those areas in the north and east 
where Tamils and Muslims have for centuries been the 
majority, maximalist, even separatist, demands are likely 
to be attractive to large numbers of Tamils in Sri Lanka, 
as well as in the diaspora. This would be a recipe for con-
tinued ethnic polarisation and political volatility.  
Both the Sri Lankan government and its main interna-
tional partners – China, Russia, India, the U.S., the EU, 
Australia and Japan – should recognise that in the ab-
sence of any government willingness to share power, the 
TNA leadership is taking a serious risk with its moderate 
position. The TNA will find it hard to reduce its demands 
further without losing credibility with Tamil voters and 
provoking a return to more militant positions. If its cur-
rent political project is not adequately supported, if gov-
ernment policies in the north and east continue along cur-
rent lines, and if the government does not begin to im-
plement the full devolutionary potential of the thirteenth 
amendment and ultimately go beyond it, the risk of re-
newed conflict can only grow. 
Colombo/Brussels, 20 November 2012
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APPENDIX B 
 
PREVIOUS DEVOLUTION PROPOSALS 
 
 
Among the many proposals for devolution of power or 
limited regional autonomy, the following have been the 
most important: 
Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact (1957) and  
Dudley Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact (1965)  
The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact was a compro-
mise between the SLFP leader, Prime Minister S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike, and the head of the Federal Party (FP), 
S.J.V. Chelvanayakam.210 Signed in July 1957, it offered 
Chelvanayakam significant progress towards his goal of a 
federal state with autonomy for a Tamil-speaking north 
east, in exchange for an end to the FP’s threatened civil 
disobedience campaign. It would have granted improved 
language rights for Tamil speakers in the north and east, 
though not full parity with Sinhala as a national language. 
It outlined a framework for regional councils, in which 
the north would have constituted one region, the east two 
or more; councils would have had the power to join for 
specific issues. It foresaw councils receiving power over 
land and government irrigation and settlement schemes. 
These would have been delegated by ordinary law, not 
devolved by constitutional change. Bandaranaike abro-
gated the pact in February 1958 after bitter protest from 
the main opposition United National Party and much of 
the Buddhist clergy, which had been an important SLFP 
constituency. 
The 1965 Dudley Senanayake-Chelvanayakam pact was a 
pre-electoral agreement between the UNP and FP leaders. 
Less extensive than the 1957 pact, it saw the UNP pledge 
to establish district rather than regional councils. The ex-
act extent of powers was never agreed, but the councils 
would have remained in effect under control of the central 
government and been established only by ordinary legis-
lation. However, the agreement also promised significant 
land rights to Tamils in the north and east, giving district 
councils there the ability to prevent further colonisation 
and demographic change and implicitly recognising the 
Tamil-speaking character of the area. Like the earlier pact, 
it would also have granted greater official status to the 
Tamil language as the language of administration in the 
north and east. After three years of negotiation and virtual 
 
210 For the text and useful analysis of both the Bandaranaike-
Chelvanayakam and Dudley Senanayake-Chelvanayakam pacts, 
see Edrisinha et al., Power-Sharing in Sri Lanka, op. cit. pp. 
216-228; also Neil de Votta, Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, 
Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka (Stanford, 
2004), chapter five, esp. pp. 102-108 and 130-143. 
non-implementation, the FP left the government in frus-
tration in 1968. 
The Moonesinghe Committee (1991-1993) 
In 1991, a parliamentary all-party select committee was 
established to devise a constitutional solution to the ethnic 
conflict through devolution.211 Named for the SLFP chair-
man, the two-year process saw the two major Sinhala-
dominated parties (UNP and SLFP) agree on enhanced 
powers for provincial councils under a quasi-federal system 
modelled on India’s.212 Tamil parties rejected the majority 
report, arguing for an explicitly federal system with greater 
powers in a permanently merged north-east province (with 
special protections for its Muslims and Sinhalese).213 
President Kumaratunga’s constitutional  
proposals (1995-2000) 
In 1995, a year after assuming office, President Chan-
drika Kumaratunga’s SLFP-dominated government pro-
posed far-reaching constitutional changes that would have 
replaced the unitary state with a “union of regions” and 
granted significantly increased powers to a newly-
demarcated “north-eastern region”.214 The proposals were 
revised three times, with devolution gradually weakened, 
over five years of complicated negotiations with the main 
opposition UNP, as well as Tamil and Muslim parties. 
When a bill to replace the 1978 constitution was eventu-
ally presented to parliament in August 2000, UNP oppo-
sition denied the reforms the necessary two-thirds major-
ity, and the bill was withdrawn.215  
 
211 See Edrisinha, et al., Power-Sharing in Sri Lanka, op. cit., 
pp. 410-413. 
212 Also signing on to the majority report were the Sri Lanka 
Muslim Congress (SLMC) and two leftist parties. 
213 The committee’s majority report also proposed an “apex 
council” that would allow for the separate eastern and northern 
provinces to function as a distinct “region” on some issues. See 
Edrisinha, et al., Power-Sharing in Sri Lanka, op. cit., p. 412. 
214 All four proposals – 1995, 1996, 1997 and 2000 – called for 
abolition of the executive presidency and return to a fully par-
liamentary system headed by a prime minister. 
215 By the time the draft constitution was presented to parlia-
ment, the war had intensified, anti-LTTE sentiment was on the 
rise, and the proposed level of devolution was too weak to get 
TNA support but too strong for many in the UNP and even the 
SLFP. The UNP argued that its opposition was not to the devo-
lution of power, but was based on the president’s refusal to agree 
to abolish the executive presidency with immediate effect, pre-
ferring instead to maintain the powers until the end of her six-
year term. The episode was taken by many as further evidence 
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The Norwegian-backed peace process (2002-2006) 
This peace process never got to the stage of negotiating 
new constitutional arrangements, but it did see a number 
of proposals for interim administrative arrangements for the 
north and east, including the LTTE’s one and only sub-
stantive proposal for governing the region.216 The Tigers’ 
2003 plan for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) 
would in effect have granted the LTTE control over both 
provinces for five years, at which point elections would 
be held.217 By the time of this proposal, the peace process 
was already in serious trouble, and the sides never resumed 
substantive talks.218 
The All-Party Representative Committee (APRC)  
(2006-2009) 
With a mandate that implicitly assumed the need to go 
beyond the thirteenth amendment, deliberations quickly 
produced a potentially important reform package. The De-
cember 2006 “majority report” of the multi-ethnic experts 
committee appointed to advise the APRC proposed a new 
constitution that would have dropped reference to the uni-
tary nature of the state and guaranteed all its “constituent 
peoples” a due share of state power, both through deeper and 
more entrenched devolution and a new upper-house with 
regional representation.219 President Rajapaksa quickly dis-
 
that any arrangements for power sharing would always be un-
dermined by “ethnic out-bidding” among the mainly-Sinhalese 
parties. This was especially the case so long as the LTTE refused 
to discuss constitutional reforms and continued to target Sinha-
lese civilians. On Sri Lanka’s history of “ethnic out-bidding”, 
see Blowback, op. cit. 
216 The UNP-led government in 2003 made two separate pro-
posals for interim administrations; both were rejected by the 
LTTE. See Edrisinha, et al., Power-Sharing in Sri Lanka, op. 
cit., pp. 650-661; also Charan Rainford and Ambika 
Satkunanathan, Mistaking Politics for Governance: The Poli-
tics of Interim Arrangements in Sri Lanka 2002-2005 (Colom-
bo, 2005).  
217 For the text and an analysis of the ISGA, see Edrisinha, et 
al., Power-Sharing in Sri Lanka, op. cit., pp. 662-675. 
218 In fact, many Sinhalese saw the ISGA as evidence that the 
LTTE was determined to use the peace process to consolidate 
its power in the north and east to the point where it could no 
longer be challenged. The SLFP immediately rejected the pro-
posal, and President Kumaratunga took back substantial powers 
from the UNP government within days and dissolved parlia-
ment in February 2004. In April elections, her coalition won a 
narrow majority, and the peace process in effect was over, 
though attempts were made to revive it after the devastating 
December 2004 tsunami.  
219 The majority report was challenged by committee members 
whose minority report proposed a much weaker form of devo-
lution. For analysis and text of both reports, see Edrisinha, et 
al., Power-Sharing in Sri Lanka, op. cit., pp. 772-855. 
tanced himself from the imaginative proposals and ensured 
that the APRC would not take up the majority report.220  
In January 2008, under pressure from India to show some 
movement towards a political solution, Rajapaksa pressed 
the APRC to deliver an “interim” proposal that would lay 
out the steps needed to maximise devolution under the thir-
teenth amendment. Its detailed recommendations for admin-
istrative and legal changes to maximise devolution under 
the existing constitution, however, were eventually reduced 
on presidential orders to just a few pages. The minimalist 
recommendations – amounting to less than full thirteenth 
amendment implementation – have not been acted on.221 
Hampered by non-participation of the TNA, UNP, and 
JVP – all of which dismissed the process as designed only 
to satisfy international demands for a political process – 
the APRC continued to meet for another year-and-a-half. 
Its final report, supposedly presented to the president in 
mid-2009, was never released, but a draft prepared by two 
members and said to be based on a committee consensus 
was eventually made public.222
 
220 In January 2007, the APRC chairman, Tissa Vitharana, pre-
pared a discussion paper that incorporated much of the majority 
report, with some elements from the minority report. On its ba-
sis, discussions among APRC representatives continued for two 
and a half years. For the text of the discussion paper, see ibid, 
pp. 856-876. 
221 The interim report claimed to aim at “fully implementing rel-
evant provisions in the present Constitution, in order to achieve 
maximum and effective devolution of powers to the provinces 
in the short term”. While it called on the government to “en-
deavour to implement the 13th Amendment to the Constitution 
in respect of legislative, executive and administrative powers, 
overcoming existing shortcomings”, it contained no suggestions 
on how to do so. Instead, it recommended elections in the east-
ern province, an interim council to be established for the north 
– a process outside the thirteenth amendment – and language pol-
icy reforms. The proposals can be found at www.peace-srilanka. 
org/index.php?option=com_ccboard&view=postlist&forum= 
10&topic=5. See Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s Return to 
War, op. cit., pp. 7-8; also Rohan Edrisinha, “The APRC pro-
cess: from hope to despair”, Groundviews.org, 3 February 2008. 
222 The government reportedly prevented the two members of 
the APRC – R. Yogarajan of the UNP and M. Nizam Kariappar 
of the SLMC – from introducing the report in parliament, so it 
was published unofficially. The full text can be found at http:// 
groundviews.org/2010/07/22/final-report-of-all-party-represen 
tative-committee-aprc/. Yogarajan and Kariappar explained that 
they had expected the final report to be published and used as 
the basis for post-war talks between the government and the 
UNP and TNA. The committee chairman, government minister 
Tissa Vitharana, is believed to have submitted the APRC’s final 
report to the president in August 2009, who then requested him 
to submit a new, more acceptable version in early 2010. This 
much shorter text, just three pages, was leaked after Vitharana 
presented it to a meeting of leftist parties in September 2010. 
Some in the Indian and U.S. governments appeared to believe 
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the Rajapaksa administration’s regular promises of the APRC 
delivering a “political solution” as late as mid-2009; see Crisis 
Group Report, India and Sri Lanka, op. cit., pp. 4-6. 
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The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an inde-
pendent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 
130 staff members on five continents, working through 
field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and 
resolve deadly conflict. 
Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams 
of political analysts are located within or close by countries 
at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent con-
flict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it 
produces analytical reports containing practical recommen-
dations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis 
Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve-page monthly 
bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of 
play in all the most significant situations of conflict or po-
tential conflict around the world. 
Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed 
widely by email and made available simultaneously on the 
website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely 
with governments and those who influence them, including 
the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate 
support for its policy prescriptions. 
The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures 
from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media 
– is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and 
recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers 
around the world. Crisis Group is chaired by former U.S. 
Undersecretary of State and Ambassador Thomas Pickering. 
Its President and Chief Executive since July 2009 has been 
Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. 
Crisis Group’s international headquarters is in Brussels, and 
the organisation has offices or representation in 34 locations: 
Abuja, Bangkok, Beijing, Beirut, Bishkek, Bogotá, Bujum-
bura, Cairo, Dakar, Damascus, Dubai, Gaza, Guatemala 
City, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, 
Kabul, Kathmandu, London, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, 
Port-au-Prince, Pristina, Rabat, Sanaa, Sarajevo, Seoul, Tbilisi, 
Tripoli, Tunis and Washington DC. Crisis Group currently 
covers some 70 areas of actual or potential conflict across four 
continents. In Africa, this includes, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbab-
we; in Asia, Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kash-
mir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Nepal, North Korea, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, 
Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in 
Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyp-
rus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, North Caucasus, Serbia 
and Turkey; in the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria, 
Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Western Sahara and Yemen; 
and in Latin America and the Caribbean, Colombia, Guate-
mala, Haiti and Venezuela. 
Crisis Group receives financial support from a wide range of 
governments, institutional foundations, and private sources. 
The following governmental departments and agencies have 
provided funding in recent years: Australian Agency for In-
ternational Development, Austrian Development Agency, 
Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian International 
Development Agency, Canadian International Development 
Research Centre, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union Instru-
ment for Stability, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ger-
man Federal Foreign Office, Irish Aid, Principality of Liech-
tenstein, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New 
Zealand Agency for International Development, Royal Nor-
wegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency, Swedish Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom De-
partment for International Development, U.S. Agency for 
International Development.  
The following institutional and private foundations have pro-
vided funding in recent years: Adessium Foundation, Car-
negie Corporation of New York, Elders Foundation, William 
and Flora Hewlett Foundation, Humanity United, Henry 
Luce Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foun-
dation, Oak Foundation, Open Society Foundations, Plough-
shares Fund, Radcliffe Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 
Stanley Foundation, The Charitable Foundation, Tinker Foun-
dation Incorporated. 
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Central Asia 
Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure, Asia 
Report N°162, 12 February 2009. 
Women and Radicalisation in Kyrgyzstan, 
Asia Report N°176, 3 September 2009. 
Central Asia: Islamists in Prison, Asia 
Briefing N°97, 15 December 2009.  
Central Asia: Migrants and the Economic 
Crisis, Asia Report N°183, 5 January 
2010. 
Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime Collapses, 
Asia Briefing N°102, 27 April 2010. 
The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan, Asia Report 
N°193, 23 August 2010. 
Central Asia: Decay and Decline, Asia 
Report N°201, 3 February 2011. 
Tajikistan: The Changing Insurgent 
Threats, Asia Report N°205, 24 May 
2011. 
Kyrgyzstan: Widening Ethnic Divisions in 
the South, Asia Report N°222, 29 March 
2012. 
North East Asia 
North Korea’s Missile Launch: The Risks 
of Overreaction, Asia Briefing N°91,  
31 March 2009. 
China’s Growing Role in UN Peace-
keeping, Asia Report N°166, 17 April 
2009 (also available in Chinese). 
North Korea’s Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Programs, Asia Report N°167, 
18 June 2009. 
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